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FROM THE EDITORS
During the last decade we have witnessed the proliferation of materials
and ideas related to social studies education . Social studies educators, social
scientists, historians, and philosophers have been and are continuing to
contribute at what seems an increasing pace to this enterprise of social
education . Scores of curriculum development projects and hundreds of
educational researchers have bombarded social studies practitioners with
competing claims for alternative ends and means, from textbooks to
classroom questioning strategies. Despite serious and thoughtful attempts to
provide systematic communication concerning theory and research in social
education within the context of the journal Social Education the expanding
volume of new ideas and research findings has led to demands for additional
channels of communication . Theory and Research in Social Education is one
response to these developments.
It is true that many other excellent journals provide outlets for articles on
social education but their very number tends to diffuse the literature so
widely that some important characteristics of a serious, scientific un-
dertaking are lost. When issues in the profession are debated in many dif-
ferent journals, the debate and the issues frequently are not joined, the points
are sometimes lost instead of honed and the literature fails to be cumulative .
We are often forced to build anew with each fresh project .
A developing profession creastes institutions that further its aims . Theory
and Research in Social Education is the latest but, we hope, not the last in
the institutionalization of systematic thinking and research in social
education . A healthy and developing profession is characterized by a critical
and sustained flow of ideas and research findings upon which an intellectual
structure can be built and tested repeatedly against reality. A professional
journal provides a forum in which ideas and research findings can be
focused, debated, refined, and developed . Among the functions that a
professional journal can perform is in helping the members of its profession
avoid false starts and misguided efforts by clarifying purposes, investigating
alternative strategies, and maximizing knowledge from professional and
scientific advances. The functions of a professional journal, in short, are to
increase the rationality of professional activity . Indeed, had such a journal
performed' these services in the 1960's, some of the myths and miscon-
ceptions from our recent past might have died earlier,, timelier deaths . What
is just as important is that we in the profession would have understood more
clearly the reasons for the decline of various pedagogical and epistemological
positions .
The College and University Faculty Assembly (CUFA) of the National
Council for the Social Studies was formed to provide a serious forum for
discussion by faculty and research personnel about the roles, functions,
nature, and consequences of educating students in social scientific,
historical, humanistic, and social policy knowledge . The first CUFA meeting
was a one-hour session at the 1965 NCSS convention held in Miami, Florida .
The CUFA meetings now extend over two days in multiple sessions that
include the presentations of fifty to one hundred papers .
A word about our title . We do not intend to separate theory and research .
We acknowledge that good research is theoretically grounded and will have
theoretical implications . Good theory leads to research and must be subject
to empirical testing or it is nonsensical. What we do intend is that, in any
given article the author may pay more or less attention to either theory or
empirical analysis. Thus, we are not willing to adopt aribtrarily the position
that, to be acceptable, an article must be empirically based . Clearly, one area
in which our literature has been deficient is in careful logical and linguistic
analyses of what we mean when we talk about social education . Theorizing
and research are necessarily bound together in the long run, but, in the short
run, one activity may receive more attention relative to the other .
A fairly complete statement of purposes of the journal is printed beginning
on the inside front cover . In this issue we have three articles and one research
note. Abstracts are printed apart from the articles to facilitate their inclusion
on note cards in professional bibliographies . We intend to add a book review
section, which Jack Nelson will edit and, of course, we will publish com-
munications to the editors . We welcome manuscripts, rejoinders, critiques,
and suggestions for our general edification or for the improvement of the
journal. Two issues are scheduled for this first year, but we anticipate moving
to quarterly publication in the not too distant future .
As in any undertaking of this type there is a need for adequate financing .
Membership dues in CUFA provide the basic support . We also offer sub-
scriptions to institutions and urge you to request your library or school to
subscribe. As this issue goes to press, the Spring, 1974 number is largely
open. We hope to be hearing from you .
Cleo H. Cherryholmes
Jack Nelson
A DISCLOSURE APPROACH TO
VALUE ANALYSIS IN
SOCIAL STUDIES EDUCATION:
RATIONALE AND COMPONENTS*
H. Michael Hartoonian
University of Arizona
Tucson
The first principle is this: people do not behave according to the
facts as others see them; they behave in terms of what seems to
them to be so. The psychologist expresses this technically as :
Behavior is a function of perception . What affects human
behavior, we are beginning to understand, is not so much the
forces exerted on people from without as the meanings existing
for the individual within. It is feelings, beliefs, convictions, at-
titudes . . . of the person who is behaving that constitutes the
directing forces of behavior .
Arthur Combs
INTRODUCTION
This paper argues for the development of student insight into a most
common phenomenon ; that is, the understanding that different men "see"
the world through different "eyes," and knowledge of this phenomenon is
necessary if students are to engage in meaningful value study, leading
ultimately to a clearer conception of their own personal values . Concomitant
to the notion of different world views, is the realization that this personal
world "view" is shaped by what might be called a conceptual framework,
mental set or mythic thought . The notion of mythic thought suggests some
intriguing questions about the relationship between value study and said
mythic thought . For example :
How can we examine and understand our own value position?
How do we undertake an investigation of value positions? (Can we study
our own mythic framework or world view directly or must it be done
indirectly?)
What kinds of explanatory models seem most appropriate to the task of
value study?
*Prepared for delivery at the third annual conference on social education and social science :
Aspects of the New Social Studies-Some heoretical Perspectives and Programs . Kellogg
Center, Michigan State niversity, May 11 & 12, 1973 . Copyright 1973 .
In consideration of these questions, this paper is organized in the following
way. First of all, a brief delineation is made of the components needed to
complement the present "state of the art" relative to value study in social
studies education . hese include an understanding of certain concept
categories, the use of narrative explanation and the utilization of future-
oriented stories for the investigation of an individual's mythic framwork .
Second, an analysis is made of mythic thought and narrative explanation . An
argument is made for the appropriateness of the narrative mode of ex-
planation to the development of an understanding of mythic thought . In
other words, narratives can give the investigator insight into the mental
framework of the author and through the nature of language, which is
metaphoric in construction, into his own (the investigator's) mental
framework . Finally, an approach to value education will be outlined bringing
into focus the use of narratives through which students can investigate value
positions (mythic thought) of the author of the narrative and/or actor(s)
within the narrative . sing the value concept of justice as an example of the
kinds of values that can be examined, "value profiles" of authors and/or
actors described in the narratives can be constructed . It is argued that
through these narratives students will be metaphorically constructing value
profiles of their own mythic thought or mental framework vis a vis the
concept of justice . he concept of justice is used because of its place of
importance in western thought and its reoccurrence in utopia and dysutopia
literature .
AL E APPROACHES IN SOCIAL S DIES
ED CA ION: SOME INADEQ ACIES
In an analysis of several major social studies projects (Hartoonian, 1972,
pp. 4-55) it was found that in dealing with values, certain critical areas or
concerns about the nature of concepts, the nature of language and the nature
of man as a future gazer were not adequately dealt with .
Nature of Concepts Although this problem is discussed in more detail
later in this paper, mention is here made of the overall dilemma-namely,
the failure to distinguish between disclosure and non-disclosure concepts .
(Point-at-ables)
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(Non-point-at-ables)
Concepts might be classified into the three categories depicted above :
disclosure concepts, picture concepts and a third set made up of a mix
between the two larger sets . he significant point in value study is that value
concepts are disclosure in nature and cannot be approached in the same way
one approaches a picture concept or a concept that carries the attributes of
both disclosure and picture. One important difference between disclosure
concepts and non-disclosure concepts can be suggested in the way one ap-
proaches said concept categories . Non-disclosure concepts can be discovered .
For example, the "law of gravity" can literally be discovered (created)
through observation, or the "law of supply and demand" can be clearly
presented to a student . Disclosure concepts, on the other hand, cannot be
discovered, they must be revealed . hat is, they must be brought out of "self"
and displayed before any analysis or understanding can ensue .
he Nature of Language Second, little attention has been given to the
nature of (common) language which calls attention to metaphoric thought,
narrative style and mythic constructs .
he true meaning of any philosophically significant word or
phrase is disclosed by looking at the ways we habitually use it in
talking about any situation in which it is naturally employed .
here is no possibility of distinguishing profitably between
meaning and use, and when in our philosphizing any such dif-
ference is assumed, we inevitably fall into error . It is both
presumptuous and a distortion of our role to suppose that we can
discover the sole proper definition of this or that fundamental
concept, which will be superior to the network of meaning
revealed in the ways in which it is used . (Burtt, 1967, p . 48)
One of the problems with present approaches to value study is the small
amount of emphasis placed upon the use of ordinary human narrative . he
dynamic character of language is such that attention to what is said can tell
us a great deal-it may take account of a large area of human experiences ; it
may draw phenomena together into a more subtle and consistent fashion ;
and it may be more fertile in its capacity for continued growth . As we relate
this phenomenon of dynamic language to the problem of concept
categorization, it is noted that language usage affects values . An example of
usage carrying with it certain values is the statement, "His brain is as quick
and as accurate as a computer ." his statement carries with it the false
analogy that a computer and the human brain are similar . As a matter of
fact, a whole new science has developed around this presupposition-the
science known as cybernetics .
he Nature of Man as Future Gazer
	
Finally, the concept of man as a
future gazer tends to be overlooked by present approaches to value study .
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he point here is that man's behavior is, to a large measure, a function of his
scan of future alternatives . his means that although man's behavior may be
shaped by his past experiences, his view of tomorrow will also determine
present actions and movements . Further, man projects into the future those
values which are most dear .
hus, as we look at the present approaches to value study developed in the
1960's and early 1970's, there appears the need to complement these works in
the areas of concept categorizations, distinguishing between the disclosure
and non-disclosure sets ; the nature of narrative (common language) and the
nature of man as a future gazer .
HE NARRA I E IN SOCIAL SCIENCE AND HIS OR :
EXPLANA ION APPROPRIA E O AL E S D
Any social inquiry must eventually come to grips with that mode of ex-
planation called narrative . o some social observers (e.g ., Gallic, 1968, and
Mandelbaum, 1967) the narrative is a necessary but not sufficient component
of social commentary . o others (e.g ., Danto, 1965, and hite, 1951), the
narrative is both necessary and sufficient in the enterprise of social inquiry.
raditionally, the technique of narrative has been categorized as applicable
only to history, but there is no reason to limit the narrative in this manner for
examples of the narrative can be found in the social sciences and the natural
sciences as well as in history. Further, and of significant importance here, is
the fact that the layman uses narrative as a way of life ; as a response to
questions, or as he tries to "explain" his state of being . " hat did you do in
school today, son?" "Charlie, why are you going to invest all your savings in
an unstable stock market?" " ell, John, what do you think of our President
now?" Questions like these are asked every day by citizens who in effect call
upon narrative for explanation . In most cases the above questions will elicit a
"story-like" response that places events in sequence and describes a change .
It is important at this point to suggest that in history and social science
explanation there is the philosophical dichotomy that, on the one hand,
wants to account for the use and potential of explanation in an empirical
fashion, and yet, on the other hand, provide insights into the basic nature of
man who more often than not operates with additional dimensions . Narrative
explanation represents a specific example of the ambivalence found in an
area of study like history which explores the nature of man, and thus, is
caught between the pull of a clearly scientific mindset which can describe
outward behavior but can neither account for nor explain causality .
here seems to be a need (in education) for a mode of inquiry that can
effectively pair the processes of description with the processes of explanation .
Narrative is, or at least can be, unifying in that it is something in which all
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intelligent people indulge. It is true, of course, that intelligent people can
indulge in many forms of explanation depending upon the nature of the
questions asked . But, narrative seems to have a high propensity for use
simply because explanation is tied to personal considerations and the
narrative model seems historically to be more in keeping with human nature
and human beings who are required to make more subjective decisions based
upon accounts or stories or beliefs relative to the situation under con-
sideration . Another way to put it is to suggest a continuum with scientific,
deductive explanation on one end and narrative, subjective expalantion on
the other. his does not mean, by the way, that the one end (deductive ex-
planation) is any better in terms of explanatory power than the other
(narrative explanation), it simply means that they are different and perform
different fuctions in response to different questions . he argument here,
however, is that in value study within social studies education a higher degree
of emphasis should be placed upon the narrative end of the continuum
simply because the questions raised tend to be more humanistic than
scientific in nature . he narrative is an accurate story about change . he
narrative is also universal in that no man is without stories . Further, it is
universal because no man is without mythic structure through which he
"sees" the world and builds support for his stories . he idea of story
development through the use of some mental framework is basic to the larger
concept of narrative explanation as it portrays man as mythologizer . hus, to
come to grips with narrative explanation it is imperative that we understand
the relationship between man and mythic thought . 1 In other words, the
narratives that men build are reflective of their mythic thought and it is this
thought which holds promise for value study in that an understanding of
man's mythic conceptions can lead to an understanding of his value
positions .
M HIC HO GH
he concept of mythic thought draws many of its attributes from classical
sources . ithin the set known as myth can be found certain universals which
have major implications transcending any one particular view of the concept .
here is, for example, a tendency to merge idea and object . he facticity of
thing becomes an extension of idea and actuality . Object does not stand for
the idea; the two are one and the same . o prick the voodoo doll with a pin is
to do the same to the man. In much the same way, when igotsky asked
young students whether we could switch names so tinat a cow would be called
ink, and ink cow, the children replied : "No, because ink is to write with and
cows give milk." (Kuhn, 1963, p . 33)
hroughout the study of mythic thought there appears always implicit and
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often explicit the notion that the mythic mentality is significantly different
from and inferior to scientific thought or empirical thought . It reflects an
incomplete and inaccurate view of man and his relations to the various
determining elements and forces of life . Irrational in nature and simplistic in
design, myth represents the baser element of man's thought . Such a view
itself reflects some of those same supposed inadequacies attributable to
mythic thought. For instance, it fails to see in the operations of man at any
time a sustaining drive for system and order and that system and order's
relating to fundamental exigencies of a given context within which man must
function. A contemporary science educator observed that the evolution of
scientific thought is marked by stages in which one set of lies replaces
another set as the theoretical framework from which scientific study
operates . In a persuasive argument, .S. Kuhn lends support to this premise
with an elaboration of the nature of scientific evolvement :
92)
. . . scientific revolutions are inaugurated by a growing sense,
again often restricted to a narrow subdivision of the scientific
community, that an existing paradigm has ceased to function
adequately in the explorations of an aspect of nature to which
that paradigm itself had previously led the way. (Kuhn, 1970, p .
In the sense that scientific thought is often posited as the opposite of mythic,
the above observation offers an interesting insight . he evolution of scientific
thought as a series of tradition bound periods punctuated by occasionally
serious breaks, rather than a simple piling-up of scientific knowledge is a
revolutionary idea; an idea which calls into play major group commitments .
he nature of scientific insights which obtain from any given group
paradigm are shaped then by the lenses of social context and sense-data
interpretation integral to that paradigm ; hence, world view elaborations
obtained are true or accurate largely within the context of the closed system
of that paradigm itself. here appears, however, an even more fundamental
question to be considered . Ernst Cassirer hinted at it when he asked, "Does
myth not signify a unity of intuition, an inuitive unity preceding and un-
derlying all the explanations contributed by discursive thought ." (Cassirer,
1966, p . 69)
S. Langer in a slightly different and perhaps more suggestive vein offered,
Ideas first adumbrated in fantastic form become real intellectual
property only when discursive language rises to their expression .
hat is why myth is the indispensable forerunner of metaphiscis ;
and metaphysics is the literal formulation of basic abstractions,
on which our comprehension of sober facts is based . (Langer,
1966, p. 173)
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In short, it is quite possible to view a conception of mythic thought as
opposed to scientific thought as being anomalous . A more viable and func-
tional conception is one which sees in mythic thought a modality of forms
and structure which provides both a spiritual unity of essence and an
imaginative sense of configuration from which all thought and consequent
behavior arises . It is strongly intertwined with the incredible human drive to
symbolize ; to derive reality in modes of symbolic configuration. Rooted in
rite and ritual, symbolic forms nevertheless find in myth their finest base of
explication and in mythic thought their most satisfying mode of extension .
Language, of course, has to be the most sophisticated expression of the
notion of symbolic forms, for it is both a reflection of the inevitability of
man's symbolic roots and a source of symbolic generation of new form
conceptions. Here, however, the concern is primarily with its latter role . hat
is, in those broader aspects of mythic thought as they relate to man's efforts
to find a unity and purpose in existence . It is indeed within the rubric of these
fundamental aspects of mythic thought where one can find a generative
source from which springs all thought and behavior of man, scientific and
otherwise . he anomaly of delineation of thought form these roots, then,
appears conspicuously obvious . As Max Mueller observed,
Mythology is inevitable ; it is an inherent necessity of language, if
we recognize language as the outward form of thought ; it
is . . . the dark shadow which language casts on thought and
which will never vanish as long as speech and thought do not fully
coincide, and this can never happen. Mythology in the highest
sense of the word is the power which language exerts on thought
in every possible sphere of cultural activity. (Mueller, 1955, p. 21)
Symbolization is the essence of all intellection and as such knows no
bounds which keeps it from pervading all thought patterns of man's cultural
forms, scientific paradigms, social models and exemplars . Language itself is
only one attribute of the mythic extensions of symbolic forms and serves to
reinforce the broader and more subtle thrusts of that principle .
Before moving ahead to a delineation of a disclosure approach to value
analysis, it might be useful to restate the significance of narrative ex-
planation and mythic thought to this type of value study. First of all, it
should be pointed out that mythic thought is the structure upon which one
develops a narrative . And, a careful look at the narrative can make explicit
certain mythic structures or value positions of the author . It is this
manifestation of a value position that will provide the foundation upon which
to build a value study approach that will, because of the metaphoric nature
of language, utlimately allow the investigator to make manifest his own value
position .
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COMPONEN S OF A DISCLOS RE APPROACH
O AL E ANAL SIS
A disclosure approach to value analysis in social studies education calls
attention to the following six important components : he explanatory power
of the narrative and concomitant mythic thought of the author, the use of
metaphor, the nature of value concepts, the construction and use of value
continua, the development of a value profile, and the augmentation of
personal definitions ofjustice . hese components, in turn, suggest a useful
process or procedure for the investigation and clarification of personal
values . hat is described below, then, is a process for dealing with values
that is consistent with the nature of value concepts, as well as the nature of
man (his languages, myths and explanatory potential) . his approach will
take a student through certain processes (experiences) that will allow him to
augment his concept of justice . o be sure, other value concepts will also be
clarified, but the primary concern is the development of an individual,
personal value profile (value position) that will help the student to better
understand the general value concept of justice in juxtaposition to his own
value profile . he processes involved in this approach include :
1 . Recognition of a disclosure concept . It is imperative that teachers and
students be able to recognize disclosure concepts from non-disclosure
concepts . Such concepts as God, love, happiness, sportsmanship,
citizenship and justice are examples of disclosure concepts that call
attention to the procedures discussed below .
2 . se of Metaphor. he recognition of a disclosure concept calls for the
use of metaphoric analysis, since disclosure concepts will not allow for
direct personal investigation . hat is, if an individual is to come to a
clearer understanding of his own position vis a vis a disclosure concept,
he will need to approach the concept metaphorically. his does not
mean that disclosure concepts have no attributes that are held in
common ; it simply suggests that a very effective way to think about
disclosures is through the use of metaphor since many attributes are,
indeed, not held in common .
3 . Narrative explanation . Since metaphoric analysis is the appropriate
mode through which the study of disclosure concepts can be facilitated,
it is the narrative which can provide metaphorically rich situations for
analysis; particularly narratives about the future .
4 . alue continua. A series of value continua is suggested which, after
being explained to students, will provide a schema for plotting the
"value profile" of the person or group discussed in the narrative .
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5 . Constructing a value profile. Students will construct a value profile
from the three value continua provided in the disclosure approach to
value analysis .
6 . alue profiles and the concept of justice . Finally, the student will
consider the value profile which he constructed from the narrative
using the three continua with general definitions of justice .
DISCLOS RE CONCEP S
Disclosure concepts are not descriptive miniatures, neither are they picture
enlargements . Disclosure points to mystery, to the need to live as best we can
with uncertainties. Disclosure concepts make extensive use of narrative
modes of explanation and rely upon metaphoric language for extensional
potential . hese concepts see no intrinsic positive value in reductionism-
that desire to quantify all phenomenia ; suggesting that if "n" is quantifiable
it is good ; and if "n" is non-quantifiable it is bad . hey also see no positive
value in suggesting that social scientists are just a few years behind
mathematicians and natural scientists and they will soon "catch up" if they
(the social scientists) only learn to be better quantifiers . he point of dif-
ference which disclosure concepts and semantical models 2 make relative to
"picturing" (reductionist) models is that of asking a different question about
the nature of man . hat question, simply stated, asks whether or not the
subjective nature of the human being is appropriate to the picture model of
explanation-e.g., the objectifiable, quantifiable model of reductionism . o
observe man as fitting into this picture of reductionism belies many
characteristics of being human and reduces explanation relative to human
behavior to such levels of simplicity which ultimately renders them useless .
ake, for example, the two concepts of "act" and "movement ." As Ramsey
suggests, by treating act and movement as synonymous (or indeed, not
bringing up the distinction in the first place) we can overlook the distinction
between participant and observer . " o act is to participate ; but what the
observer observes and all he observes is movement-more or less complex,
more or less expressible in roles . But to participate and to observe are rarely
equivalent-to particpate in a kiss, for example, is vastly different from
merely observing one." (Ramsey, 1964, p . 25)
he point of this argument is, of course, that there is a need in any ap-
proach or model that deals with people to provide insight into ourselves . his
claim suggests that there is no observable data that can ever be adequate in
social explanation. Ramsey suggests that this claim is justified because :
. . . this insight into ourselves, this self-disclosure, is the source
for each of us of that subjectivity which is logically demanded by
the objectivity of all the behavioralists' data . here can-and it is
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a logical "can"-be no objects without a subject which cannot
itself be reducible to objects . he ideal of logical completion is
never a third-person assertion ; it is a first-person assertion . He
does x necessarily carries with it a pair of invisible quaotation
marks, so that it is to be set in some frame as "I am saying . . . "
and without this wider frame the third-person assertion is
logically incomplete . (Ramsey, 1964, p. 26)
In making the point another way, it can be argued that the concept of
"organism" is out of place with human explanation. Peter inch raises the
question this way : " ould it be intelligent to try to explain how Romeo's love
for Juliet enters into his behavior in the same terms as we might want to
apply to the rat whose sexual excitement makes him run across an electrically
charged grid to reach his mate? Does not Shakespeare do this much better?"
A DISCLOS RE APPROACH O AL E ANAL SIS :
OPERA IONS AND PROCED RES
Again, it should be noted that the present approach to value analysis calls
attention to four kinds of considerations on the part of the teacher :
1. the nature of disclosure ;
2. the utility of metaphoric thought ;
3. the explanatory power of the narrative ; and
4. the clarification potential of value criteria .
he procedures that the student will experience can be listed as follows :
1 . An explanation of the value continua is given . he teacher may (or may
not) want to use the five clarification questions that are listed below . If
these questions are used, the class should be divided into groups of
about five members each . he teacher can then discuss each continuum
(each continuum is discussed in detail below) with the students . he
five questions are then passed out to the students who are now working
in a small group . Each group must come to a consensus true or false
answer to each question . he discussion in the small groups should
help students further define the end points in each continuum .
2. Second, the narrative (metaphor) is presented and the students are
asked to pay particular attention to the person or group within the
narrative who is under study.
3. Next, the student is asked to place the person or group from the
narrative on the three criteria, constructing a "value profile" for the
actor(s) .
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4. Finally, the student is asked to compare the "value profile" of the
actor(s) with given definitions of justice-for example : an appropriate
division of social advantages or rights and responsibilities .
his approach operates, then, in four phases . Phase one presents an ex-
planation of the three criteria and suggests the use of a series of true-false
questions which are related to each of the three categories of the
classification scheme for value analysis . hese questions are considered and
answered through consensus within small (student) groups . his exercise is
carried out before the model is applied to any narrative so students can
clarify any definitional problems that might subsequently interfere with the
functioning of the model . he questions will also serve as discussion starters .
Phase two encompasses the application of the three continua to a
narrative3 . he narrative reflects the mythic thought of the author and/or
actor(s) described therein. In Phase three of the approach the student is
asked to formulate a "value profile" (make visible a disclosure) for the
author, actor or actors (and metaphorically for himself), and in Phase four
the student will compare his constructed "value profile" with the general
value concept of justice.
A Classification Scheme for alue Analysis tilizing Clarification Questions
for se in Small Groups
orientation toward
	
orientation toward
obedience and universal and logical
punishment principles or conscience
Does the behavior of the actor(s) (including what he says) manifest itself in
a commitment to personal wants and avoidance of punishment or in self-
accepted principles and a concomitant concern with the establishment of
mutual respect and trust?
rue-False
1 . An individual can behave only in accordance with personal well
being .
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I
I .
other person
self (mutual respect and
orientation trust) orientation
I I I II
II .
2 . here is appreciably no difference between principles of personal[
conscience and principles of norm conformity when decisions are
made .
3. It is more just to base behavior upon principles of mutual respect
and trust than on principles of obedience .
4. It is easier to live with self-condemnation than it is to live with grout
condemnation .
5. It is more likely that an individual will be more creative, and
therefore, more human, if he adheres more closely to universal
principles or conscience than to social rules or role behavior .
situational
(honesty in a par-
	
general
ticular situation) (honesty)
I I	I	I I	I
Does the behavior of the actor(s) (including what he says) manifest itself in
consistent adherence (at all times and in all places) to a particular explicit or
implicit set of rules, 4 or is the behavior contextual or situational relative to
modes of conduct?
rue-False
1 . Always adhering to a mode of conduct, for example, "always
honest," is consistent with the highest values of human dignity and
worth .
2. It is impossible to establish rules of conduct for future situations.
3 . he behavior that is most consistent with human dignity and worth
is behavior that is situational in nature-that is, following no pre-
established modes of conduct .
4. If an individual's behavior is situational relative to particular modes
of conduct, it is reasonable to assume that he is following the dic-
tates of his conscience and not the dictates of the group .
5. Since man lives in a society that is constantly changing, it is im-
portant that he become flexible and situational in his ethical
positions .
1 2
III .
modes of
personal conduct
goal (terminal values) 5
	
(instrumental values)6
(major goals in a person's
life which may or may not be
end states of existence)
Does the behavior of the actor(s) (including what he says) manifest itself
toward an established (explicitly or implicitly) goal ; or is the behavior more
consistent with personal conduct which may or may not help in the at-
tainment of said goal?
rue-False
1. If a goal such as equality, freedom or salvation is, in reality,
unobtainable, it makes little sense to pattern behavior toward the
achievement of such goals .
2. Modes of personal conduct are always dependent upon goals .
3. Goals are always dependent upon modes of personal conduct .
4. Societal goals are always generalized personal goals .
5. Modes of conduct based upon principles of norm conformity are
more consistent (and beneficial) to societal goals than those modes
of conduct which are based upon principles of conscience .
he purpose of this series of true-false questions is, of course, to foster the
kinds of discussion that will draw attention to the spectrum of intra and
interpersonal values that abound within individuals and within groups of
individuals. Second, they will make personally manifest various value per-
ceptions that are held relative to the three continua . It is argued that this
experience of self-searching is prerequisite to the application of the model to
a narrative. It is important to place significant emphasis upon discussion 7
for it provides the opportunity to foster clearer understandings of value
positions .
As for the use of the value continua, let us now consider them individually
and then as a functioning whole . First, however, the question of rationale for
continuum usage needs to be discussed . e can consider the (use of) con-
tinuum as a method of analysis which calls attention to three important and
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related attributes. First, there is the quality of "dynamic logic ." hat is, the
continuum offers a logic which can handle continuous change. By suggesting
that human nature is too subtle for Aristotelian logic, the claim can be made
that there is a demand for a law of the included middle ; e.g., a thing can be
both p and not-p. Second, the continuum provides a setting for the use of
metaphoric thought which helps us view the world from different vantage
points. It also helps us pair different ideas, which can reflect fresh synthesis
and new insights into the nature of value incongruencies that exist in our
lives . Finally, there is the attribute of humanism or holisticism, which
suggests that value (human) analysis demands a command of the whole scale
(as opposed to a single value) of motives and values before a given event,
person or situation can be realistically evaluated .
At any rate, humanism is an effort to place all doctrine on an
appropriate scale, to see it in relation and in degree instead of as
isolate truth or vagrant error, to provide a perspective in which
dualistic aspects may again be seen as aspects of a whole-the
organic whole that is the included middle . he yes and no
constantly asserted in daily behavior are naturally translated into
right and wrong, good and bad ; but we can make choices without
becoming Manichaeans . (Muller, 1962, pp 36-37)
AL E PROFILES
An important aspect of the disclosure approach is the delineation of a
value profile of an individual or group under consideration, and ultimately,
to illuminate the value profile of the investigator to himself . A value profile is
a value position viewed by the investigator using the classification schemes of
the three continua . alue profiles may be consistent as an actor moves from
one situation to another, or they might be changeable or relationally in-
consistent. he only claim here is that the investigator using the model
should be able to locate the actor on the three continua and obtain a "view"
of his values in situation S .
he use of the continua (seen normally as quantifying tools) might seem out
of place when dealing with a disclosure concept, but it is argued that there is
in all disclosure concepts some degree of commonality that will allow for
communication. Concept "commonalities" can be advanced through this
disclosure approach and thus is the only claim made relative to "operational
definitions," that is, the clarification of those attributes held in common or
consistent with a definition based upon an intellectual or cultural heritage.
A further consideration of this approach has to do with its ultimate
usefulness relative to helping students discuss and, hopefully, come to a
better understanding of the nature of justice-that ultimate virtue or moral
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principle upon which our present values of equality, fairness, reason,
rightfulness and righteousness are derivatives . he position taken here is that
acquaintance with the concept of virtue8 as a drawing out process calls
attention to exposing value conflicts .
he first step in teaching virtue, then, is the Socratic step of
creating dissatisfaction in the student about his present
knowledge of the good . his we do experimentally by exposing
the student to moral conflict situations for which his principles
have no ready solution . Second, we expose him to disagreement
and argument about these situations with his peers . (Kohlberg,
1970, p. 82)
A disclosure approach for value analysis should ultimately, then, help the
student reveal and see his or her value profile of the one moral principle,
which in this case is justice . he demand for a "clear picture" of justice,
thus, seems to imply that there is some conception in which all applications
of the work meet like lines converging to a common center, or, in more
concrete terms, that there is some principle whereby human life might be so
organized that there would exist a just society composed of just men . A
society so composed and organized would be ideal, in the sense that it would
offer a standard of perfection by which all existing societies might be
measured and appraised according to the degrees in which they fell short of
it. Any proposed reform, moreover, might be judged by its tendency to bring
us nearer to, or further from this ideal . Justice, of course, is at the center of
most philosophical questions dealt with by western writers, and self-
disclosure of the concept is important to civilized man . he concept of
justice, then, will serve as the focal point around which this disclosure ap-
proach will be applied .
Let us now look at the individual facets of each continuum .
I .
Does the behavior of the actor(s) (including what he says) manifest itself in
a commitment to personal wants and avoidance of punishment or in self-
accepted principles and a concomitant concern with the establishment of
mutual respect and trust?
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other person
self (mutual respect and
orientation ' f I trust) orientation
I
orientation toward orientation toward
obedience and universal and logical
punishment principles or conscience
Continuum #1 relflects the work of Lawrence Kohlberg who has analyzed
moral conduct and has constructed the following three levels and six stages :
Level I-Premoral
Stage 1 .-Obedience and punishment orientation. Egocentric deference
to superior power or prestige, or a trouble-avoiding set. Objective
responsibility .
Stage 2.-Naively egoistic orientation . Right action is that in-
strumentally satisfying the self's needs and occasionally other's .
Awareness of relativism of value to each actor's needs and perspective .
Naive egalitarianism and orientation to exchange and reciprocity .
Level 11-Conventional Role Conformity
Stage 3.-Good-boy orientation . Orientation to approval and to
pleasing and helping others. Conformity to stereotypical images of
majority or natural role behavior and judgment of intentions .
Stage 4.-Authority and social-order-maintaining orientation .
Orientation to "doing duty" and to showing respect for authority and
maintaining the given social order for its own sake . Regard for earned
expectations of others .
Level III-Self-Accepted Moral Principles
Stage 5.-Contractual legalistic orientation . Recognition of an arbitrary
element or starting point in rules or expectations for the sake of
agreement. Duty defined in terms of contract, general avoidance of
violation of the will or rights of others, and majority will and welfare .
Stage 6 .-Conscience or principle orientation . Orientation not only to
ordained social rules but to principles of choice involving appeal to
logical universality and consistency . Orientation to conscience as a
directing agent and to mutual respect and trust . (Kohlberg, 1966, p . 7)
In the Kohlberg schema, the individual makes decisions in terms of
personal wants and avoidance of punishment . He then seeks approval by
conforming to norms and authority for their own sake . If and when he
matures, he develops self-accepted principles and is concerned with the
establishment of mutual trust and respect .
Kohlberg's analysis of moral development suggests that the teaching of
values is a matter of helping individuals grow into increasingly advanced
stages of personal organization, enabling them to mediate their needs and
those of others . Kohlberg sees a direct interrelationship between value
education and personal development. he attractiveness of defining the goal
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of moral education as the stimulation of development rather than as teaching
fixed virtues is that it means aiding the child to take the next step in a
direction toward which he is already tending, rather than imposing an alien
pattern upon him." (Kohlberg, 1966, p . 19)
No claim is made here of moving the individual toward "higher levels of
moral development." Although this might, indeed, happen, the purpose of
this continuum of the model is to help the investigator determine the "value
position" of the actor(s) under investigation, and ultimately his own (the
investigator's) value position with respect to Continuum #1 . he hope is that
through the investigation of value positions the individual will come to
appreciate the various positions from which any situation can be judged and,
perhaps, ultimately develop ideals that embrace alternative positions and
give a basis for action . Seeing alternative value positions in the narratives
under study, the individual will be less inclined to see (and adopt) value
positions as rigid, simplistic rule systems . He will, on the other hand, be
better able to build concepts that accommodate different stances or provide
negotiation among them . He will also be more willing to structure his own
inquiry or to see himself as a transactor within the complexity of situations
that is the milieu of life .
In dealing with the dichotomy of self- (obedience and punishment)
orientation and other person (mutual trust and respect) orientation, it is
important to discuss some of the mutual influences that exist between the
individual and the group . One's first impression is to suggest that all
behavior is based upon principles of personal conscience, as all decisions are
personal. Or, as Allport (1924) suggested, there is no psychology of groups
which is not essentially and entirely a psychology of individuals . his,
however, belies the research of many persons such as Lewin that suggests a
great deal of behavioral influence is exerted by "the group ."
If recognition of the existence of an entity depends upon this
entity's showing properties or constancies of its own, the
judgment about what is real should be affected by changes in the
possibility of demonstrating social properties . . . he taboo
against believing in the existence of a social entity is probably
most effectively broken by handling this entity ex-
perimentally . . . . (Lewin, 1947, pp. 5-41)
One can always ask, when does personal orientation become group
oriented? And, when does group oriented behavior become personal?
Analysis begins, for our purposes, here when distinctions can be made
between the concept of self- (obedience and punishment) orientation and the
other (mutual respect and trust) orientation . First of all, we must state that
an individual's ability to experience, to decide and to even control his own
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behavior is dependent in many subtle and involuntary ways on his
relationships with other people . (Hare, 1962, pp . 191-265) . his means, of
course, that individual behavior is a function of group involvement-yet it is
just that, and only that-a function of group involvement . In every instance
the individual must call upon innate mental faculties in response to decisions
that must be made . wo factors make individual involvement significant : (1)
each individual has a unique personal history and (2) unique innate mental
abilities . hus, in any action (or thought) the fact of personal uniqueness is a
factor, and although behaviors of individuals can, indeed, must, be viewed
against the backdrop of group norms, the ability to obtain a better or clearer
view of a person's value profile depends on seeing him (the actor) as an in-
dividual in relationship to others. As we make decisions (live from day to day)
we can develop a picture of reliance on self versus reliance on the group . his
knowledge will give us a beginning relative to understanding the actor's value
profile, and will also allow us to make better predictions relative to the ac-
tor's future behavior . ltimately, when this continuum is used with the other
two continua of this approach, we may have more clues relative to the actor's
future behavior . ltimately, when this continuum is used with the other two
continua of this approach, we may have more clues relative to the actor's
conception of the moral principle of justice . Beyond this, of course, the
process of studying the actor in this way (as applied in a narrative situation)
will ultimately help in clarifying the investigator's value position relative to
his orientation toward mutual respect and trust on the one hand versus his
orientation toward obedience and punishment on the other . It is suggested
that this knowledge should help in illuminating his (the investigator's)
concept of the moral principle of justice .
II .
situational
(honesty in a
	
general
particular situation) (honesty)
Does the behavior of the actor(s) (including what he says) manifest itself in
consistent adherence (at all times and in all places) to a particular explicit or
implicit set of rules ; or is the behavior contextual or situational relative to
modes of conduct?
his second continuum is related to and expands the analysis which began
with Continuum #I . In the first continuum the investigator defines the point
that separates an individual's commitment to principles of personal con-
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science from that individual's allegiance to principles of norm conformity.
Continuum #11 represents analysis from another vantage point by taking
the notion of personal versus group value claims and viewing these value
claims from a situational versus a general position (relativism-
universalism9) . he dichotomy suggested by Continuum #11 might best be
stated in two questions . hat should I (the actor) do now? hat, in general,
are the reasons for this action now? hese questions should not be seen as
mutually exclusive; for as was stated above, a moral principle is not only a
rule of action but also a reason for action . here is also the consideration of a
middle ground (as the continuum suggests) between allegiance to general
rules or principles and some kind of individual, situational choice . It can be
argued, of course, that even existential "choice" is based upon some moral
system which the individual accepts .
he present continuum places emphasis upon the concept of reason as an
important criteria for judging an actor's preference for general versus
situational commitment . hat is, in placing an actor or group of actors on
Continuum #II, it is imperative that problems of justification not be ignored .
o argue for a particular position means to argue toward consistency with
generally held values.
It follows, however, that an actor can also opt for situational positions in
his value choice . But, to be rational (as the term is used here) involves a
willingness and the skill to weigh that value choice in the light of general
societal (group) values . And, vice versa, an actor can opt for a general
position in his value choice, but, again, is rational only when he is willing to
examine that value choice in the light of a situational orientation .
hus, analysis through Continuum #11 can occur only when the narrative
provides argument of the type that calls attention to the ethical basis of value
controversy, e.g., the desire on the part of the actor(s) to persuade his
audience that his position is consistent with the general values or principles
of man (or at least consistent with the general values of the group he is trying
to persuade) .
. . . important reasons exist for not abandoning the search for
consistent application of general principles . First, principles used
to justify action may be impossible to eradicate from memory .
hether we like it or not, principles of justice seem to remain in
our nervous systems . he question becomes "How should such
principles be used?" e could also argue that many situations do
not differ in the most relevant or salient aspect of moral choice-
both the American Revolution and Negro rebellion concern basic
human rights and how best to attain them . Making explicit such
commonalities among issues helps to clarify the issue over which
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people disagree . Comparing situations and testing whether
principles of the past can be applied consistently does not
necessarily make one a slave to accepting past principles . On the
contrary, comparing and distinguishing among situations
stimulates rejecting some principles as irrelevant, qualifying
others as not sufficiently complete to deal with the new situation,
and accepting others as adequate in some instances, no matter
how "old" the rules or principles might be . . . Finally our
commitment to rationality, by definition, inevitably leads us to be
concerned with consistency and general principles, but it also
commits us to making qualifications and fine distinctions that
often in effect totally reject many "general principles" that the
situationist would evidently prefer not to consider at all .
(Newmann, 1970, pp. 103-104)
Continuum #11 then, allows the investigator to determine the value claim
of an actor(s) in light of his (the actor's) ability to deal rationally with said
value claim, and to place the actor(s) on the scale between the end points of
commitment to situational values and commitment to general values .
III.
	
modes of
goal personal conduct
(major goals in a person's
life which may or may not be
end states of existence)
Does the behavior of the actor(s) (including what he says) manifest itself
toward an established (explicitly or implicitly) goal ; or is the behavior more
consistent with personal conduct which may or may not help in the at-
tainment of said goal?
ith Continuum #111 we expand further the disclosure approach for value
analysis bringing into consideration the complex notion of goals . he
concept of goals (goal oriented behavior) rests upon a consideration of
alternatives-alternative and conflicting goals, as well as various modes of
conduct .
Clearly, we have occasions in life when decisions have to be made not only
between or among conflicting goals, but also between goals and modes of
conduct (or stating it differently between instrumental and terminal values).
" here may be times when certain modes of conduct (honesty, cleanliness) are
20
dysfunctional to certain goals (becoming rich, joining a hippie commune)
and to better understand the rationality or lack of rationality that is made
manifest by an actor's decision is most germane to this continuum . he
distinction and relationship between modes of conduct and ends or goals
might best be explained in the following two examples . Consider the building
of a bird house as an expressed end of having a bird house . he ordering of
activities is irrelevant as long as the end (a built bird house) is achieved .
Clearly, this is a goal that stands apart from an ordering of activities . o be
sure, it might be more advantageous to saw the boards before one applies
paint, but this is simply technique and not a matter of construction law .
Next, consider a dance . he activities related to the dance and their ordering ;
e.g ., rhythm, steps and mood are not instrumental to the dance ; they are the
dance. his end-state is one with (and logically consistent) the mode of
conduct or an ordering of activities. Continuum #III should allow the in-
vestigator to determine between these two types of ends-conduct
relationships and simultaneously develop insights into the nature of goals-
rational ends .
aken together, these three continua when applied to a narrative, can
provide an analytical framework which can make manifest the actor's and
the investigator's value profile, and to see that value profile in relation to the
moral principle of justice . No claim is made relative to changing value
positions of investigators toward any predetermined goal . All that can be said
of this approach is that it should help clarify value positions of actors under
consideration in relationship to the three continua and through this process
a clearer and more realistic view of the investigator's values should emerge .
hree final points need to be made relative to this approach . First of all, it
is assumed that the three continua will not be seen to apply equally in all
narrative situations. For example, in any given narrative it might be the case
that only one or perhaps two of the continua are applicable . However, in
those situations where all three continua can be used, it is assumed that this
will be done . Second, it is again reiterated that the main function of this
model is to illuminate the "value position" of the actor under investigation,
and ultimately, the value position of the investigator .
Finally, there is the question : " hat value profile (position on the three
continua) is most consistent with the concept of justice as defined above?"
he following diagram is suggested as the optimum value profile vis a vis the
concept of justice. It also suggests further research relative to empirical tests
of the value position suggested below as well as other positions and their
consistency with the definition of justice . other person
I '
	
self (mutual respect and
orientation trust) orientation	 x	I
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he reason for the above placement rests on arguments presented above .
For example, the position on Continuum #1 (other people oriented) calls
attention to the principle of justice as an obligation (moral) to respect the
right or claim of another person . he position on Continuum #11 (general or
universalism value position) calls attention to the principle of justice as an
obligation to rationality involving the willingness and skill to weigh value
choices in the light of general societal values . he location on Continuum
#111 (midway between terminal and instrumental values) calls attention to the
principle of justice as both a reason for action (goal or terminal value) and a
rule of action (mode of conduct or instrumental value) . Justice implies a
balance of the two notions of reason and rule .
A disclosure approach to value analysis attempts to deal with the symbolic
activities of man . It attempts to illustrate a non-picture, and thus, becomes
an adequate conceptual tool useful in comprehending human values in all
their variety and richness . A disclosure approach to value study also suggests
a new philsophical synthesis among such concepts as subjective, descriptive,
psychological and logical . Above all, this new synthesis calls attention to the
heterogeneity of the human organism, individually and collectively . It posits
the notion that value(s) cannot be adequately explained any more than the
process of cultural function can, without a careful consideration of individual
and collective man, including his total cultural and physical environment .
Any other position will ultimately yield a study of values which is no study at
all, but a sterile catalog of value forms or technique .
CONCL SION
his paper calls for a conscious development of a more holistic approach
to value study . hile it does not posit a systematic repression or rejction of
Skinnerian objectivism or materialism, it does call attention to the need for a
more careful balance between materialist and mentalist models in un-
derstanding human values .
II .
situational
(honesty in a general
I particular situation) (honesty)X
	
I
III . modes of personal
goal (terminal conduct(instru-
values mental values)
One basic argument of the paper has been the contention that man is both
a structured and structuring animal whose concepts are developed and
augmented not only by outside stimuli, but more importantly, perhaps, by
inward or mental mythic thought or paradigms that shape the outside world
of things, movements and acts . A second argument has been the metaphoric
nature of language and the explanatory power of the narrative for finding out
about "self." In other words, through a narrative study of an actor we see not
only said actor but also ourselves mirrored in the actor's words and behavior .
Finally, the argument was presented that a fundamental difference exists
between disclosure and non-disclosure concepts and one appropriate mode
for the study of disclosure concepts is the use of value continua ; developed
out of a consideration for the meaning of "value ." In focus, then, the point of
value study vis a vis value continua, as here developed, calls attention to the
need to come to some self-understanding of value (disclosure) concepts .
alue concepts, such as justice, happiness or love, often mean so many
different things to different individuals that they tend to leave one in that
state of mind which suggests that "the concept that means everything
conveys no meaning at all ." hus, the need for concept clarification through
value continua is posited as consistent with the nature of disclosure concepts
and the need to clarify said concepts in order to communicate more ef-
fectively and to develop self-meaning .
Although this paper places emphasis upon the concept of justice, a
disclosure approach to value analysis can also be applied to other value
concepts such as happiness, success, kindness, etc . It might be interesting,
for example, to have students 10 develop an "optimum value profile position"
for happiness similar to the one developed above for the concept of justice.
As with the value profile for justice, each student would have an opportunity
to discuss, compare and contrast his value profile with value profiles of other
students . Hopefully, through group processes, students will have an op-
portunity to come to a better understanding of the value concept under
investigation.
In the final analysis, this paper poses not simply an approach or a project
but also a problem . It does so because it is far from clear to what extent and
by what methods we can probe the value-belief systems of individuals and
groups . he standards of such investigations represent an issue that is still, to
a significant measure, far from settled .
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FOO NO ES
1 Mythic thought and myth are separate concepts with some common but many different at-
tributes . Our concern, here, is with mythic thought as opposed to mythical thought .
2 1t is upon an expansion of the semantical model that this value analysis approach is based (see
Kaplan, 1964, and Ramsey, 1964).
3 Future oriented narratives are suggested for use with this approach .
4 Or set of principles .
SX is good in itself .
6X is good because it leads to .
7 Here again, the point of discussion is self-awareness and students must operate in an at-
mosphere of trust . he student must be free to "explose" his conceptions to others .
8 Socrates suggests that virtue cannot be taught-however, he Republic makes manifest the
nature of virtue as a disclosure concept obtainable through analogy and questioning .
9For a more thorough discussion of the relativism-universalism dilemma, see Clarifying
Public Controversy by Fred Newmann, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970, Chapter 4 .
10 11 should be pointed out that this approach has been used extensively with teachers and
students at the high school level with little observable difficulty relative to the constructing
and describing of value profiles . But, it may be the case that the experience of "value profile
construction" is only appropriate for students who find dealing with abstract concepts
comfortable and at the same time exciting .
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INDUCTION IN THE NEW SOCIAL STUDIES*
Richard F . Newton
Temple University
One of the phrases which became very popular during the sixties was
"inductive approach ." This phrase, or some variation of it, was applied to
every conceivable aspect of social studies education . In this essay the nature
of the inductive process will be examined. It will be examined as an
epistemological problem. That is, a problem focused around the ways of
knowing. Later in the essay some of the materials produced under the rubric
"New Social Studies" will be examined in the context of this inductive
problem .
It is important to stress how induction and inductive approaches to
knowing will be used in this paper. A great deal of the current usage has left
us with no secure guidelines around the term . Induction will be used in this
paper in the sense of how one knows . This is not the same as saying that one
learns inductively. To learn something is essentially a psychological problem
whereas knowing is a philosophical problem . This paper addresses itself to
the latter .
Another point which demands clarification before any analysis is at-
tempted is the difference between the discovery of knowledge and the
confirmation of knowledge . Discovery and confirmation appear to be two
separate acts. The failure of social studies educators to differentiate between
the two has caused some problems . Essentially the process of discovery is
psychological, or as Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions pointed
out, a sociological one .1 A scientific discovery may be the result of hard work,
a flash of insight, or a stroke of genius . It does not, at any rate, appear to be a
strictly logical act .
On the other hand how one comes to justify this discovery as new
knowledge is surrounded by an agreed upon set of logical rules. There is
reasonably widespread agreement upon a set of guidelines for the
justification of knowledge . It is this logic of justification which constitutes the
methodology of a given discipline. This methodology is what one refers to
when discussing the scientific method . It is only through the methodology of
a given science that the various workers come to accept new theories or
generalizations . Thus, the first section of this paper will examine induction in
some detail in an effort to ascertain what is meant by inductive procedures,
or methodology .
*The author wishes to thank all of the many individuals who have reacted to earlier drafts of this
paper . Especially helpful was Professor Stanley P. Wronski.
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WHAT IS INDUCTION?
One of the most widespread misconceptions is the belief that deductive
arguments proceed from the general to the specific and inductive arguments
proceed from the specific to the general . This is not true. The following
examples will help to demonstrate this .
Deductively Valid Arguments
general to general
All gorillas are apes .
All apes are mammals .
All gorillas are mammals .
particular to particular
Alfred is a wolf.
Alfred has a tail .	
Alfred's tail is the tail of a wolf.
particular to general
One is a lucky number .
Three is a lucky number .
Five is a lucky number .
Seven is a lucky number .
Nine is a lucky number .
All odd numbers between 0 and 10 are lucky numbers .
In much the same manner inductive arguments go from a set of particular
premises to a general conclusion .
Inductive Arguments
general to general
All economic recessions in the past have come to an end only with
the outbreak of war .
All recessions come to an end only with the outbreak of war .
particular to particular
Boat A is a Chris-Craft, and boat B is a Chris-Craft .
Both boats have 265 horsepower engines .
Both boats have the same size and shape hulls .
Boat A can go 30 knots .
Boat B can go 30 knots .
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general to particular
All emeralds previously found have been green .
The next emerald to be found will be green.
Thus, the difference between inductive and deductive arguments is not to be
found in the generality or particularity of premises and conclusion, but
rather in the definitions of deductive and inductive .
Having dispensed with the definition which most people use when they talk
of induction the question arises ; what is induction? Probably the best way to
explain the difference between deduction and induction is to show some
examples .
Example of a deductive inference :
(I)
	
No gourmets enjoy banana-tuna fish souffles .
Mark enjoys banana-tuna fish souffles .
Therefore Mark is not a gourmet. (Skyrams, 1966, p . 7)
(I) is a valid deductive inference . The conclusion follows necessarily from
the premises. The form of this inference is such that ifthe premises are true ;
then the conclusion must be true. In contemporary logic and philosophy of
science, "deductive inference" is used in the sense of necessary (demon-
strative) inference ; the conclusion is claimed to follow with logical necessity
from the premises .
Example of an inductive inference :
(II) George is a man .
George is 100 years old .
George has arthritis .	
George will not run a four minute mile tomorrow . (Skyrams, 1966,
p. 8)
In (II) the conclusion is (at most) only logically probable, not necessary. In
an inductive inference, the truth of the premises does not guarantee the truth
of the conclusion . If the premises are true, the conclusion may or may not be
true. An inductive inference is an inference whose conclusion is not claimed
to follow necessarily but only with some degree of probability ; hence in-
ductive inference is commonly used interchangeably with "probable in-
ference."
Before going any further we must make clear the meaning of the term
demonstrative inference . It is important that we understand that a
demonstrative inference is one whose premises necessitate its conclusion : i.e.,
if the premises are true then the conclusion must be true. A non-
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demonstrative inference is simply one which fails to be demonstrative ; thus,
its conclusion is not necessitated by its premises . The conclusion could be
false even if the premises are true.
As Braithwaite puts it :
Induction is not a demonstrative form of inference like
deduction . In deduction the reasonableness of belief in the
premises as it were overflows to provide reasonableness for the
belief in the conclusion . This happens because the conclusion is a
logical consequence of the premises and cannot be false while the
premises are true . (Braithwaite, 1968, p . 257)
This source of difference between an inductive and deductive inference is
the property of truth preservation . Indeed, this is what demonstrative and
nondemonstrative inferences are all about . This truth preservation is
achieved by sacrificing any extension of content . "The conclusion of such an
inference (demonstrative) says no more than do the premises . . . ." (Salmon,
1967, p. 8) We refer to this type of conclusion as demonstrative because the
conclusion cannot be false if the premises are true because the conclusion
says nothing that was not already stated in the premises. This is why
deduction presents no logical problem .
The case is quite different for induction . "There is no logical impossibility
in the premises being true and the inductive conclusion false ." (Braithwaite,
p. 258) Thus, induction is called ampliative; the conclusion has content not
present either explicitly, or implicitly, in the premises .
This characterization is quite different from some of the more traditional
definitions of induction . "Induction is not defined as inference from the
particular to the general ; it is not defined as the inverse of deduction ; it is not
defined as induction by enumeration ; it is not defined as a method of
discovery." (Salmon, 1963, p . 346) Rather, induction is defined as a non-
demonstrative type of inference whose conclusion is ampliative . It seeks "to
establish a conclusion on the basis of premises which do not logically exhaust
the content of those conclusions ." (Salmon, 1963, p . 347)
HUME'S PROBLEM
David Hume, in the seventeenth century, raised the, fundamental question
about this inductive method . How do we obtain knowledge of the unob-
served? This is really the problem in (II) above . The basic problem with
induction is one of obtaining inductive evidence which allows us to predict
the future . 2
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Let the course of things be allowed hitherto be ever so regular ;
that alone, without some new argument or inference, proves not
that, for the future, it will continue so . In vain do you pretend to
have learned the nature of bodies from your past experience .
Their secret nature, and consequently all their effects and in-
fluence, may change, without any change in their sensible
qualities. This happens sometimes, and with regard to some
objects: Why may it not happen always, and with regard to all
objects? What logic, what process of argument secures you
against this supposition? My practice, you say, refutes my
doubts. But you mistake the purport of my question . As an agent,
I am quite satisfied in the point ; but as a philosopher, who has
some share of curiosity, I will not say scepticism, I want to learn
the foundation of this inference . (Hume, 1745, pp . 316-317)
The fundamental question is one of justification of conclusions concerning
unobserved phenomena, or concepts . The discovery of knowledge, and the
justification of knowledge are two entirely different subjects. Confusion
arises though, for "when we ask how we can acquire knowledge of the
unobserved, it sounds very much as if we are asking for a method for the
discovery of new knowledge. This is, of course, a vital problem, but it is not
the fundamental problem Hume raised ." (Salmon, 1967, pp . 6-7)
The question is thus : Given that one has "established, or highly con-
firmed, a certain conclusion according to the accepted canons of scientific
justification, on what grounds may we accept this conclusion as embodying
knowledge?" (Salmon, 1963, p . 342) When one applies a scientific method it
is usually done so in anticipation of gaining knowledge . What David Hume
did was to demonstrate exactly how difficult it is to legitimize the cognitive
claims of science. Indeed, his analysis was such a searching and probing one
that even today no one has really provided universally accepted answers to his
questions .
SOME PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE
PROBLEM OF INDUCTION
From the time of David Hume's original criticism people have attempted
to solve the problem of induction . No one has yet been successful . What we
have are a great many proposed solutions. It is an impossible task to sum-
marize, or examine, all of these . What I have done here is to select a few on
the basis of how-commonly they are used, and also how effectively they might
be integrated into the new social studies. It is this last criterion-
effectiveness-that is the most important . While Baye's Theorem deals with
the inductive problem as well as any other proposal, I have not included it
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because of the difficulty that would be encountered in effectively introducing
it into secondary school studies curriculums .3 Also left "aside has been the
response of . . . unregenerate deductivists who strive vainly to show Hume's
analysis wrong	(Scheffler, 1963, p . 228)
The reader should be well cautioned not to regard the following proposed
solutions as being anywhere near a complete catalogue of attempts to justify
induction . Rather, the rest of this section should be seen as a listing which
demonstrates the seriousness and extreme difficulty of the inductive
problem, as raised by David Hume .
Uniformity of Nature
One of the more commonly offered justifications is that nature is uniform .
Hume directed a great deal of his efforts at just this point . He explained that
one cannot expect inductive inferences to yield true results if nature is not
uniform .
All inferences from experience suppose, as their foundation, that
the future will resemble the past, and that similar powers will be
conjoined with similar sensible qualities. If there be any suspicion
that the course of nature may change, and that the past may be
no rule for the future, all experience becomes useless, and can
give to no inference or conclusion . (Hume, p. 316)
The question now becomes one of attempting to prove that nature is
uniform, for if this can be proven then indeed we will have justified in-
duction . The first thing we realize in this quest is that a deductive inference
could not possibly prove that nature is uniform in the required sense (past,
present, and future) for deduction is nonampliative ; it can tell us nothing
about the future .
This leaves us then attempting to prove that the world is uniform through
an inductive argument . At this point we become open to the challenge as to
why we should place our faith in such inductive arguments . We cannot reply,
because nature is uniform, for that is what we are trying to prove. Thus, we
are left attempting to prove that induction is justified on the ground that we
have inductively ascertained that nature is uniform . This cannot be done .
Thus, it cannot be demonstrated, or proven that nature is uniform through
either inductive of deductive arguments . "Furthermore, the distinction
between valid deduction and nondemonstrative inference is completely
exhaustive. Take any inference whatsoever. It must be deductive or non-
demonstrative .' ' (Salmon, 1967, p. 20)
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Common Sense or Rational Justification
This position holds that inductive arguments are justified if they yield true
conclusions from true premises most of the time . This can be established only
inductively, or deductively. The reasons for this are the same as were given
above; our definition of induction and deduction are exhaustive . An in-
ference must be demonstrative (deductive) or inductive .
A deductive argument could not possibly justify the use of induction for it
is nonampliative . Hence one can only make claims about the past and
present, not the future . It is the future that we are concerned about . Will any
of our inductive inferences in the future hold true?
If we could [justify induction deductively] we would have
proved that the conclusion must be true if the premises are . That
would make it necessarily truth-perserving, hence, demon-
strative . This, in turn, would mean that it was nonampliative,
contrary to our hypothesis . Thus, if an ampliative inference could
be justified deductively it could not be ampliative . It follows that
ampliative inferences cannot be justified deductively . (Salmon,
1967, p. 11)
A deductive argument can only state that induction has worked in the past
and present, not the future .
Likewise we cannot justify any type of ampliative inference inductively . To
attempt to justify induction by an inductive argument we are in the position
of having to assume that induction is reliable to prove that induction is
reliable . Salmon writes that to justify any sort of ampliative inference in-
ductively would
require the use of some sort of nondemonstrative inference . But
the question at issue is the justification of nondemonstrative
inferences, so the procedure would be question begging . Before
we can properly employ a nondemonstrative inference in a
justifying argument, we must already have justified that non-
demonstrative inference . (Salmon, 1967, p . 11)
Thus, induction cannot "be justified by reference to the past successes of
inductive procedures of predictive policies ." (Scheffler, 1963, p . 315) .
Before leaving this section I wish to look further at one of the more
complex attempts to justify induction inductively. Max Black has produced a
highly sophisticated and widely discussed attempt to justify induction
through the use of self-supporting arguments . The major point in this
argument is that the traditional fallacy of circular argument (Petitio prin-
cippii) entails the assumption, as a premise, that the conclusion is to be
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proved. Black holds that the situation is quite different for self-supporting
inductive arguments .
He has formulated two inductive rules : (Black, 1954, p . 196)
R1 To argue from all examined instances of A's have been B to all A's
are B .
R2 To argue from Most instances of A's examined in a wide variety of
conditions have been B to (probably) the next A to be encountered
will be B .
Each of these has two self-supporting arguments :
(al) All examined instances of the use of R1 in arguments with true
premises have been instances in which R1 has been successful .
Hence:
All instances of the use of R1 in arguments with true premises are
instances in which R1 is successful .
(all) R1 has always been reliable in the past.
Hence:
(a2)
RI is reliable .
In most instances of the use of R2 in arguments with true premises
examined in a wide variety of conditions, R2 has been successful .
Hence :
In the next instance to be encountered of the use of R2 in an
argument with a true premise R2 will be successful .
(a22): R2 has usually been successful in the past .
Hence (Probably) :
R2 will be successful in the next instance .
"Our task accordingly narrows itself down to determining whether and in
what sense either (al) or (a2) is guilty of circularity ." (Black, 1954, p. 198)
Whatever is present it is not the circularity of petitio principii, for any
argument that is circular in this traditional sense must be a valid deductive
argument (the conclusion must be true if the premises are true .) Neither (al)
nor (a2) are deductively valid ; thus the argument cannot be circular .
Both Skyrams (1966) and Salmon (1967) have fairly coherent demon-
strations that Black's work, while essentially irrefutable, is nonetheless of
little value in solving the problems of inductive justification . Using Black's
rules both authors show how it is possible to create
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a system of inductive logic that would be diametrically opposed to
scientific inductive logic and would be one which presupposed on
all levels that the future will not be like the past . We shall call this
system a system of counterinductive logic. (Skyrams, p . 34)
Thus "it sounds as if a self-supporting argument is applicable only to rules
we already know to be correct . (Salmon, 1967, p. 16) What all this amounts to
is that while Black's argument is interesting and of theoretical significance it
does not satisfy the requirements for an inductive justification . A system for
justification must give reasons for using that system rather than any other .
"Thus if two inconsistent systems, scientific induction and coun-
terinduction	(Skyrams, 1966, p . 36) can meet the requirements then the
system cannot be an adequate definition of justification.
This section has demonstrated that the logical justification of induction,
within this type of conceptual framework, is seemingly impossible. It cannot
be done through a demonstrative inference since that is nonampliative, and
neither can it be done through an ampliative argument since that would be
circular (with the exception of Black's formulation, which seems to be of little
practical consequence) . As Salmon writes :
It is extremely difficult, psychologically speaking, to shake the
view that past success of the inductive method constitutes a
genuine justification of induction. Nevertheless, the basic fact
remains: Hume showed that inductive justifications of induction
are fallacious, and no one has since proved him wrong . (Salmon,
1967, p. 17)
Hypothetico-Deductive
One of the more interesting ways of coping with the inductive problem is
the hypothetico-deductive approach . This is often regarded as a process
which has great usefulness if one assumes that induction presents no
problem. It is not often thought of as constituting a pure justification . From
a general hypothesis and particular statements of initial conditions a par-
ticular predictive statement is formulated . This includes the "deducing [of]
the hypothesis in question from higher level hypotheses which themselves
have been inductively established ." (Braithwaite, p . 261) Also, these
hypotheses could be framed on the basis of some experience with empirical
data .
Policies for establishing general hypotheses in accordance with
inductive principles of inference on the basis of empirical data
will be called "inductive policies." They all have the feature in
common that they require a basis of experience to build upon ; in
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this they differ from many non-inductive policies for establishing
general hypotheses, e.g ., that of deducing them from
metaphysical premises. (Braithwaite, 1968, p . 261)
This notion of experience is most important in scientific work utilizing the
hypothetico-deductive method .
After the selection of a particular hypothesis, it is accepted, at least for a
time, as being true. This statement is now regarded as one having predictive
value. By careful observation it is determined whether the predictive
statement turned out to be true . It is this idea of predictive value which is
most important, in that it provides a motive for using a scientific model of
explanation. The reason
scientists use the inductive policies that they do use is the
predictive value of these policies-their success in yielding
hypotheses from which testable consequences can be
deduced . . . . This is the justification for following a particular
inductive policy . . . namely, that following this policy yields
hypotheses which are in fact confirmed and not refuted by ex-
perience. Good inductive policies are those which do what we
require of them; they enable us to predict, and thereby partially
to control the future. (Braithwaite, 1968, p . 264)
With this model man proposes hypotheses and nature decides on their
truth, or falsity. If by observation we determine that a particular hypothesis
has no predictive value, i .e ., it turned out to be false, then we say that this
hypothesis is disconfirmed . A point that has caused some discussion is the
idea of rejecting an hypothesis . Many hold that one contrary instance is not
adequate for the rejction of a hypothesis . There are generally only two cases
where it might indeed be the case that the proponent of a hypothesis would
continue to hold his hypotheses after encountering contrary evidence .
The first of these cases may be where "the thesis is a statistical hypothesis
where the rejection of the hypothesis on the evidence of a set of observations
is always a provisional rejection which may have to be cancelled on the basis
of further evidence." (Braithwaite, 1968, p . 260) This would be where one
established acceptance, or rejection, at the .05 or .01 levels of significance .
The second case does not involve a statistical hypothesis as such, but
nonetheless the hypothesis might "be treated as a statistical one in that it is
to be rejected (and only provisionally rejected at that) only if the contrary
instances show deviations from the value asserted in the hypotheses which
exceeds a certain amount ." (Braithwaite, 1968, p. 260) This might be found
in some functionalist explanations where certain conditions are thought to be
necessary for a specific type of activity to be carried out, but this is expressed
in a nonstatistical manner .
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Ifthe observation reveals that the statement is true, or of predictive value,
we then say that the hypothesis is confirmed to some extent . The important
idea here is that the hypothesis is not conclusively proved by any one or more
positively confirming instances . It may only become more highly confirmed .
Since the conclusion of an induction is a general hypothesis,
there is no time at which it is conclusively proved . The hypothesis
may, of course, be established by the induction, but its establish-
ment at one time will not prevent its refutation at a later time if
contrary evidence occurs. (Braithwaite, 1968, pp. 265-266)
The question "naturally arises at this point whether we ever have or ever
can have adequate evidence." (Danto, 1968, p . 132) What is usually the
problem at this point is that there exists a misunderstanding of the difference
between understanding and knowing. To understand something is to only be
a party to a convention. This is quite different from " `Knowledge' in the
epistemological sense ." (Danto, 1968, p. 133) Danto sees this as a problem in
the adequacy of language and feels the first step should be concentrating on
the difference between understanding and knowing . For our purposes here it
will suffice to say that no hypothesis can ever be totally confirmed . This is the
skeptical position assumed in most scientific investigation .
The question is often asked as to why this model is viewed as an inductive
one? It is because the inference from the original observation to the
hypothesis is surely not deductive. This inference cannot possibly be thought
of as a demonstrative one, hence it must be nondemonstrative or inductive .
Another distinction is that : "A pure deductive system, like that of arithmetic
hangs from its summet and can be indefinitely extended downwards ; an
impure deductive system, like that of a natural science, is supported on its
empirical basis and can be indefinitely extended upwards ." (Braithwaite,
1968, p. 354)
It took a long time for scientists to realize that the hypothetico-
deductive inductive method of science was epistemologically
different from the prima facia similar deductive method of
mathematics; and that, in properly imitating the deductive form
of Euclid's system, they were not ipso facto taking over his
deductive method of proof. (Braithwaite, 1968, p . 353)
The big difference between math and science is that in math, and logic, the
propositions are logically necessary, while in the sciences they are only
logically contingent . In the next section we will return to this hypothetico-
deductive system and see how several of the social studies projects have made
use of it.
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Even though this system is, or can be, both effective and elaborate it does
not refute Hume's charge. The hypothesis of the hypothetico-deductive is still
ampliative; the conclusion is a statement whose content exceeds the ob-
servational evidence . Indeed, this is why we can never say that a hypothesis is
true, but rather must be satisfied with a highly confirmed, or falsified
hypothesis .
Pragmatic Justification
This attempt seems to be quite fruitful even though it does not fully solve
the problem . The pragmatic approach accepts Hume's argument up to the
point of agreeing that it is impossible, a priori, to establish that any inductive
inferences will ever again have true conclusions . This position holds, as with
Hume, that we cannot validly show either a priori, or a posteriori, that nature
is uniform in the sense of past, present, and future, prior to a justification of
induction .
At this point the advocate of the pragmatic justification would claim that
even if induction cannot be justified on logical grounds, and hence its success
as a method of prediction cannot be established in advance, induction can be
shown to be superior to any alternative method of prediction . As we stated
above it cannot be demonstrated that nature is uniform, but advocates of this
position argue that we can examine two possibilities : Nature is uniform or
nature is not uniform . "It is fairly clear that inductive inferences will suc-
cessfully establish knowledge of the unobserved if nature happens to be
uniform, and that they will fail if nature should turn out to be chaotic and
lawless." (Salmon, 1963, p . 354)
This in no way guarantees that we shall be successful in any particular
instance considered but only says that in repeated applications the number of
successes would be greater than if we acted against inductive conclusions .
What comes from this is the following table . (Salmon, 1963, p. 354)
Nature Uniform
	
Nature not Uniform
Induction
Employed
Other Method
Employed
Success
Success or
Failure Possible
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Failure
Failure
Most important is the last entry in the table for here it is asserted "that even
the alternative methods will fail if nature is not unfiorm ." (Salmon, 1963, p .
355). Hans Reichenbach, (1938), the major proponent of the pragmatic
method, reasons that the continued success of any alternative method would
constitute a uniformity, contrary to the principle of nonuniformity . Thus, if
this other method worked then induction would also work .
Hence induction will be successful ifany other method could succeed . "We
have, therefore everything to gain and nothing to lose by induction ."
(Salmon, 1963, p . 355) If induction is destined to failure then so also is any
other method . Reichenbach, in working through this, essentially uses in-
duction to mean induction by enumeration, rather than induction by
elimination . Induction by enumeration is where we wish to go from an ob-
served sample of a class to an inference which governs the entire class . He
couples the rule we discussed above to a frequency interpretation of
probability. He then holds that the limit of the relative frequency of the finite
sequence equals (or is closely approximate to) the relative frequency of the
sequence as it nears, or reaches, infinity . (Reichenbach, 1949).
This pragmatic method of inductive justification is rather successful, but it
is not a justification ; that is, a justification in the sense that it provides a
reason for logically making inductive decisions. It is a justification only in the
sense that it provides a motive for using inductive policies . The major dif-
ficulty is that it is a formidable task to state a principle of uniformity that is
strong enough to assure the success of inductive inferences and weak enough
to be plausible . This is a variation of the Goodman paradox . (Goodman,
1965). Uniformity of nature is not an all-or-none affair ; it seems to exist in
degrees and this is where the pragmatic method for inductive justification
becomes unsatisfactory. Still it offers many possibilities and if it is possible to
overcome the paradox concerning the uniformity of nature it will become
even more useful.
A Probabilistic Approach
One of the approaches to solving the problem of induction that has found
great favor is the probabilistic method . It begins with the belief that Hume's
original search for the justification of induction was misconceived . The
problem begins when people try to find a way of proving that inductive in-
ferences with true premises will always have true conclusions . This is seen as
the task of deduction . The only thing that an inductive argument does is
establish a conclusion as probable .
As used by philosophers of science probability has two basic meanings .
They are: (I) probability refers to the degree of confirmation, and (II)
probability refers to the long run relative frequency . (Carnap, 1959, p. 334)
Each notion of probability has its own set of advocates . The frequency in-
terpretation is usually associated with von Mises, (1957), Reichenbach, (1949
and 1959), and Feigl (1949). Probability when conceived of in terms of the
degree of confirmation is best represented by Jeffreys (1939), and Keynes
(1921) .
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Neither side views the other as having much to offer and hence they reject
all other theories but their own. Carnap believes that this "controversy
between representatives of different conceptions of probability is due to the
blindness on both sides with respect to the existence and importance of the
probability concept on the other side ." (Carnap, 1959, p . 335) We need not
concern ourselves here with this mutual disagreement except in that it allows
us to speak of two distinct meanings of the concept of probability .
Probability viewed as a theory of frequency essentially says : That which
has happened often in the past, and is now happening often in the present,
will continue to happen often in the future. The claim is not that inductive
inferences will always be true, but rather that they will frequently be so . If X
has happened frequently in the past it will probably happen at about the
same frequency (or rate of regularity) in the future . This, as a form of in-
ductive justification, clearly does not suffice . Hume has already shown that
this claim cannot be substantiated . There is no question that inductive in-
ferences cannot be expected to lead to the truth in all cases. This was hardly
the point of Hume's argument . Instead he argued that we not only "cannot
justify the claim that every inductive inference with true premises will have a
true conclusion, but further that we cannot prove that any inductive in-
ferences with true premises will have a true conclusion ." (Salmon, 1968, p .30)
When probability is thought of as the degree of confirmation of a proposition
the position is taken that the calculus of probability is formulated in terms of
statements . It is often thought of as the logical interpretation of probability .
The notion of whether or not a statement is probable is tied closely with the
notion of decision making . Thus, probability is viewed as some sort of degree
of rational belief. This raises the whole idea of evidence, and what constitutes
evidence .
Under this idea of probability to ask if we should accept conclusion X is to
ask if we should believe, or accept, the evidence. Salmon feels that this is
tantamount to asking if we should be rational . (Salmon, 1968, pp 30-31) He
then formulates a problem and sets up three inductive rules concerning the
evidence. Depending on which rules one selects there are three possible
outcomes. Now the question becomes which conclusions are acceptable .
"Whether a given conclusion is supported by evidence-whether it would be
rational to believe it on the basis of given evidence-whether it is made
probable by virtue of its relation to given evidence-depends upon selection
of the correct rules from among the infinitely many rules we might con-
ceivably adopt ." (Salmon, 1968, p . 31)
Now the question of what does it mean to be rational becomes an im-
portant question. Is it rational to believe on the basis of evidence as defined
by one rule as opposed to another rule? What indeed constitutes evidence?
The inductive problem still exists . It is simply reformulated as a problem
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concerning the provision of adequate ground for the selection of inductive
rules. "It is easy to show that inferences which conform to our accepted
inductive rules establish their conclusions as probable . Unfortunately, we
can find no reason to prefer conclusions which are probable in this sense to
those which are improbable ." (Salmon, 1967, p . 52) These questions are
essentially a reformulation of the original problem . "Introduction of the
concept of probability does not dissolve the problem of induction though it
may lead to some interesting reformulations ." (Salmon, 1963, p . 353)
Concluding Remarks on Induction
In no way should the preceding positions on induction be seen as a
complete catalog of the attempted solutions. We have not even touched on
the postulational approach of Bertrand Russell, (1948), nor Kant's (1950)
doctrine which holds that there are synthetic a priori truths . Neither have we
gone into the work done by John Stuart Mill (1874) . Rather what I have
attempted is to show the difficulty of the problem Hume has presented . His
argument has so far withstood all attacks . The problem concerning the
validity of judgments about future or unknown cases remains . Essentially the
problem is that "what has happened imposes no logical restrictions on what
will happen ." (Goodman, 1965, p. 59)
THE NEW SOCIAL STUDIES AND INDUCTION
Having now looked at the problem of induction the attention will now
focus on how the new social studies deals with this phase of social-scientific
methodology. There is though, one problem in such an analysis . The social
scientist is seldom very concerned with the underlying philosophical
problems in his discipline . Kaplan has written that this detachment between
problems of a philosophical nature and how research actually gets done is
characteristic of philosophical methodology. "It affects science only very
indirectly." (Kaplan, 1964, p. 23) Social studies being at least one step
removed from the social sciences feels the effect of philosophical problems
even less .
Thus it should be of no surprise to find that the various programs in the
new social studies seem to be little concerned with the problem of induction .
Of course, different projects and people handle induction differently, just as
they are aware of the problem to a greater or lesser extent . One of the most
interesting items must be the fact that the problem is dealt with at all, even if
in an obtuse manner . While the inductive problem is not totally neglected, it
is relegated to a rather low level of priority in many of the materials .
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Part of this was due to the nature of the new social studies projects
themselves. As was earlier mentioned, they were usually a joint venture
between social scientists and educators . Since neither one of these groups has
been overtly, and overly, concerned with the problems of methodology it was
to be expected that these new programs might also reflect this lack of con-
cern. Of course this was not equally true of all programs . Actually at this
point we are almost twice removed from the original problem of induction .
Since to look at all of the programs, and leaders, which have come under
the rubric new social studies would prove to be an impossible task I have
selected a few which seem to be representative of the field . It is a slightly
ironic twist that in a critique of induction, as used by the social studies, that
at this point we suffer from the problem of induction . We must select a
sample from the total population, which hopefully is somewhat represen-
tative of the whole. This has been done on the basis of attempting to look at a
broad selection of the various types of material available for today's schools.
Edwin Fenton
Professor Fenton must be considered one of the leading figures in the new
social studies . In this essay I have simply limited my critique to those
materials and publications which bear the name of Edwin Fenton. There is
no doubt that he had a great deal of responsibility for all the Carnegie-
Mellon materials, but so also did a great many others . Since it is impossible
to separate the work of Alfred Hall, or John Good, from that of Edwin
Fenton I will look only at material Fenton has personally authored . This
poses no real problem as he has written a fair amount, and is rather explicit
in describing how he personally feels the social studies should be organized .
The fact that his views may be different at the present time from what they
were when most of his writing was done is of little consequence for this
analysis .
Fenton uses the term induction to mean the type of argument which goes
from the specific to the general and is nondemonstrative . In his scheme the
important thing is that the teacher ask the proper analytical question . For
Fenton "the type of questions a teacher asks as he leads a student to look at
the logical implications of his position holds the key to success ." (Fenton,
1967, p. 44) As the student becomes more skilled in the process of inductive
inquiry the teacher becomes less important . He believes that "a student
knows how to use analytical questions as a part of thinking only when he can
do so independently." (Fenton, 1967, p. 48)
The structure of a discipline is the "analytical questions which historians
and social scientists put to data in order to make it meaningful ." (Fenton,
1966a, p. 326) This is quite different from what others in social studies
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education mean when they refer to the structure of a discipline . Without
going into too much detail it can simply be said that many others see
structure as being the main body of concepts and generalizations which
make up the discipline. For our purposes here the most important thing
about Fenton's definition is that these analytical questions generate
hypotheses . (Fenton, 1966a, p . 326) Fenton is not particularly clear on what
exactly constitutes a hypothesis. Nonetheless one could not be too far wrong
in assuming that he intends nothing unusual here from the standard
definition of hypothesis.
The next step is the validation, or confirmation of the hypothesis . Fenton
considers this to be a very important idea.
The development and validation of hypotheses constitute the
heart of the mode of inquiry in both history and the more
rigorous social sciences . (Fenton, 1966a, p . 326)
The social studies projects devote much of their efforts to
teaching the rules by which social scientists verify, modify or
reject hypotheses. (Fenton, 1967, p . 15)
A well trained student ought to be able to state specifically the
steps required in the process of developing and validating a
hypothesis. (Fenton, 1966c, p . 188)
We increase our store of useful knowledge in both our personal
and professional hypotheses . (Fenton, 1966b, p . 5)
Fenton is never very clear on how he views the logic of validation . After
giving the validation of hypotheses a place of importance in the course of
study he quickly moves on to other aspects of the curriculum . Even when he
gives sample lessons it is still almost impossible to determine what exactly is
meant by the logic of validation . This weakness occurs in all of his writings .
One must agree with Fenton that the process whereby social scientists
modify, verify or reject hypotheses are important, but one would prefer that
this receive more clarification .
It must be surmised that Fenton is using the hypothetico-deductive model
of explanation. (Fenton, 1967) He goes from the hypothesis back to the data
in search of confirming evidence. From this step one then decides what to do
with the hypothesis . It may be modified, accepted, or rejected . Fenton is not
too clear on either the status of a hypothesis which has been confirmed or one
which has been rejected . He does not discuss the notion that a hypothesis is
never fully confirmed-confirmed to the extent that we may have fully
guaranteed results. Nor is he clear on when we should reject a hypothesis .
This comes from his apparent lack of concern about the nature of
evidence, and the place of unobserved instances when one makes a
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generalization . It is extremely difficult to find an instance where Fenton
discusses the nature of future cases in a law-like generalization . Neither does
he talk of the difficulties of going from a sample to the entire population of
whatever one is discussing . Fenton gives the impression that the process of
validation is not too difficult . As we have previously shown though, it is
extremely difficult. Fenton does not mention, or even allude to, the problem
with induction that Hume formulated . Even though he is using a
hypothetico-deductive mode of explanation he does not bring this out, nor
does he clearly explain why one uses such a pattern of explanation .
Massialas and Cox
Two individuals who achieved a certain degree of prominence in the new
social studies were Byron Massialas and C. Benjamin Cox. Massialas and
Cox (1966) prefer the term inquiry to that of induction, or analytic question,
and draw heavily from the work of John Dewey . If one were inclined to
complain at the free and easy use of terms of Edwin Fenton then the work of
these two authors might prove to be much more enjoyable, not to mention
being more informative. In Inquiry in the Social Studies, the probabilistic
nature of induction (inquiry) is made very clear. Also, rather than lightly
dismissing the problem of induction the authors feel it must be dealt with.
This is probably best done by the rigor with which students analyze
problems .
Massialas and Cox work within a definite empiricist framework, and are
skeptical of the orderliness of the universe .
Contrary to an accepted myth, science makes no assumption of
an absolutely orderly universe . Were this the case, scientists
could state their findings in more definitive terms than they do .
(Massialas & Cox, 1966, p. 92)
The problem of making an inference from the sample to the population, or
the process of inferring something from a number of known cases to the
unknown cases, is also dealt with. This presents itself as a problem in the
formulation of laws . The only problem is that
the exact nature of the law will never be known for certain since
all possible cases and instances can never be accounted for .
While science and the scientific method yield reliable knowledge,
both the conclusions and the methods are open-ended and self-
correcting-i .e., they are subject to continous revision and
confirmation . (Massialas and Cox, 1966, p . 92)
This represents one of the clearest statements that might be found in social
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studies on the nature of the hypothetico-deductive approach to the inductive
problem. That Massialas and Cox are utilizing the hypothetico-deductive
approach to the inductive problem should be quite obvious, since they seem
to emphasize the idea that an answer may never become true, but only highly
confirmed . Also, the fact that an answer is always subject to continuous
revision if some of the empirical facts change is typical of the hypothetico-
deductive approach to the inductive problem .
For Massialas and Cox a hypothesis "is the primary declarative general
statement of explanation or solution . . . " (Massialas and Cox, 1966, p . 117)
Working from this the student collects and arranges his data to see whether
or not the hypothesis is tenable . This data which is marshalled is "offered as
evidence to support, qualify or refute the hypothesis under consideration ."
(Massialas and Cox, 1966, p . 115) If the evidence is generally supportive to
the hypothesis under consideration then a generalization is arrived at .
If the evidence marshalled for the consideration of a hypothesis is
largely supportive, then the concluding generalization will be
similar or even the same as the hypothesis . . . . If the discussion
produces certain data which is true only under qualified con-
ditions, then it is reconstructed so that the conclusion reflects
these conditions . (Massialas and Cox, 1966, p . 132)
Most important for our analysis here is the tentative aspect of the conclusion
reached. This conclusion takes the form of a generalization and it
represents the most tenable solution to the problem based on all
available evidence. The generalization however is never taken to
represent a final truth. Its tentative nature is recognized .
(Massialas and Cox, 1966, p . 119)
The aspect of tentativeness is raised several times in this book .
It must be borne in mind that the final conclusion does not
constitute an absolute-even though all possible data have been
brought to bear on its proof-is always considered as tentative
and as an approximation of reality. (Massialas and Cox, 1966,
pp. 119-120)
Massialas and Cox thus offer an excellent discussion on the problems of
induction. The nature of the problem is fully explained without getting
overwhelmed by purely technical problems . They could, though, bring out
the point that only one solution is being applied (stressing that results may be
subject to change in the future) to the basic problem . Also, what is called
inquiry, or induction, is only one type of probabilistic inference. A
probabilistic inference, which is nondemonstrative, and goes from the
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general premise to a general conclusion is not discussed . Neither is a type of
nondemonstrative inference which goes from a general set of premises to a
specific conclusion discussed . Nonetheless enough material is included in
this work, designed for an undergraduate methods course, assuring that the
future teacher receives an adequate introduction to the problem of induction .
Sociological Resources for the Social Studies
The various episodes produced by SRSS may be placed under five different
broad classifications . These are :
1. Methodology
2. Demography
3. Social Structure
4. Social Change, Conflict, and Deviance
5. Social Psychology
For our purpose here two episodes have been selected : Testing for Truth :
A Study of Hypothesis Evaluation and The Difference Between Two and
Three: Family Size and Society . The first comes under the topic of
methodology and the latter under demography .
This project, as do many of the others in the new social studies, emphasizes
inductive techniques.
From its inception, SRSS has emphasized inductive procedures,
both in teaching and in dealing with sociological problems . To
sociologists and high school teachers designing our materials we
said : ` . . . all SRSS materials must be organized around the data
of actual empirical investigations, which point toward significant
theoretical conclusions .' (SRSS, 1967, p . 3)
For this project induction is defined as "reasoning from the particular to the
general . . . " (SRSS, 1967, p . 3) They would begin the process with questions
which would lead to "thinking through to plausible answers and getting the
evidence-assembling and analyzing the data that enables a choice among
plausible answers first preferred ." (SRSS, 1967, p . 4) This is quite in keeping
with our definition of induction that was given earlier in this work . The main
difference being that the SRSS prefers a narrower type of definition .
The first episode to be examined is the one entitled The Difference Bet-
ween Two and Three : Family Size and Society . This episode which has not
yet been made available commercially has as one of its stated purposes the
illustration of "some methods and concepts used by sociologists and
demographers to study human behavior . . . . " (SRSS, 1968, p . 1) "The
teaching strategy suggested is an inquiry approach." This episode consists of
two sets of exercises. The first is
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. . . . designed to enable the student to see how social standards-
norms-effect not only people's attitudes about what a good
family size is and how many children they themselves expect to
have, but also the number of children actually born . (SRSS, 1968,
p. 3)
The second set of exercises is arranged so that
students can determine the numerical potential of various family
sizes for population and growth in the United States. (SRSS,
1968, p. 2)
One possible criticism that may be leveled against this episode is the one so
often made against many of the new programs in the new social studies . A
student must inquire in such a manner so that he reaches a conclusion which
has already been designed into the material . The data presented to the
student, along with several readings seems pointed toward getting the
student to accept certain value positions . The teacher should use this
material not as an exercise demonstrating open inquiry, but rather an
example of one exercise which deals with the logic of validation . The episode
rather than saying the students "will use an inquiry approach to reach their
conclusions," might better state that a certain mode of inquiry (inductive)
will be used to demonstrate the logic of validation . The purpose of this
episode should be to show how inductive validation is carried out within
certain types of explanation . This exercise is not meant to be an open-ended
type of activity which allows all manner of answers; rather it is best used as
an example of inductive explanation working within an empirical
framework .
This episode does little though to point out that inductive arguments
contain conclusions which are, at best, only highly probable. It tends to leave
one with a feeling of certainty in the conclusions . The episode also uses
inquiry in the somewhat restricted sense of an inductive argument which goes
from particular premises to a generalized conclusion . As was earlier pointed
out inductive arguments are not limited to this one type . Another problem
with this episode is that throughout, the emphasis is on technique rather
than on methodology. The student is given a set of questionnaires which has
already been filled out by another class, and all the student working with the
episode must do is organize the data on predesigned worksheets . The data is
then transferred to worksheet 2, a predesigned graph . The emphasis seems to
be on data collection and the tabulation of this data . Thus, even though the
word inquiry is used in defining the purpose of the episode it should be clear
that technique application might be a better term . Very little, if any, material
is designed to show the student the logic, or procedure, whereby the social
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scientist validates his conclusion. Inductive problems are discussed very
little ; instead the emphasis is on the utilization of demographic techniques .
Another episode, Testing for Truth: A Study of Hypothesis Evaluation,
does an outstanding job in the very area which drew so much criticism in the
previous episode . As in the other episode the mode of explanation is em-
pirical. The instructor's guide explains that the student
will state hypotheses, predict behavior, construct and administer
a questionnaire, tabulate and analyze data, test their hypotheses,
draw conclusions and generalize . (SRSS, 1969, p . 5)
The stated aim of this episode "is to introduce students to one method of
scientific inquiry ." (Instructor's Guide, p . 3) Early in the episode the material
mentions the notion of verification and reliable knowledge . The teacher's
guide points out that "this exercise should provide the contrast between the
easy generalization of everyday life and the careful (and skeptical) search for
reliable knowledge the social scientist pursues as he sets up hypotheses as
targets for testing." (p. 11)
One of the problems in induction is generalizing from the sample to a
population . This is always a problem in that the generalization is not
demonstrative, or necessary . This episode asks the student : "Suppose we had
drawn a different sample . . . . How probable is it that we would have ob-
tained similar results ." (Instructor's Guide, p . 7) This is essentially the
problem of induction which was raised by Hume . Here the student is asked to
cope with it . Also, the notion of induction being an argument whose con-
clusion is, at best, probable, is clearly brought out . The student is cautioned
that he "should always be prepared to say how probable it is that your
sample is representative of the whole population being studied ." (Instructor's
Guide p . 7)
The episode ends by pointing out the difficulty involved in stating a causal
connection between two variables. What is usually done is the familiar
correlational study. This entire episode is an excellent example of how the
problem of induction may be presented to students in secondary schools . The
entire problem of making inferences from sample to population and the
notion of the predictive value of hypotheses are examples of this . In this
episode the student receives a complete introduction to the hypothetico-
deductive style of explanation . Thus, the student should become quite aware
of the nature of the inductive problem .
Harvard Social Studies Project
This program, under the direction of Donald W . Oliver, developed a
program based on the analysis of public controversy . Its objective was to
train students to examine and analyze the kinds of controversies that give rise
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to social conflicts . The material has been designed to encourage students to
consider situations and problems in the light of social science theories and
explanations. The materials are now presently produced by American
Educational Publications .
The object of each case study "is to gather detailed information about a
relatively small class of phenomena, such as the growth of a corporation, the
decision to drop the atom bobm, the living conditions of a Negro family in an
urban slum, or the behavior of a politician seeking election ." (Oliver and
Newman, 1968, p 8) It is then "assumed that examination of a limited in-
cident will yield conclusions applicable to a more general class of incidents ."
(Oliver and Newman, 1968, p . 8)
It is interesting that the material points out that the "inductive (or
`discovery') approach allows students to search for and reach conclusions on
their own . . . " 4 (Oliver and Newman, 1968, p . 9) Methods of discovery and
validation are two different things . Discovery of new knowledge is not the
same as the justification of an inductive inference, yet here the writers seem
to- be using the two interchangeably. It could well be that they are stating
their belief that there is an inductive method of discovery, or possibly, the
authors are simply using the most popular word in the new social studies .
The complaint is not with their methods, but rather with the looseness which
they give to the term induction . It would have been much better had they
stayed with the term discovery, for it describes the approach better and
would have resulted in less confusion.
In Teaching Public Issues in the High School, which grew out of the
Harvard Social Studies Project, Oliver and Shaver point out that there are
three levels of disagreement in the study of public issues . (p . 89)
1. The values surrounding the disagreement are in conflict .
2. The facts around the conflict are not in agreement .
3. The meaning of the words surrounding the conflict need clarifying .
In elaborating the second category, the authors discuss one aspect of the
problem of induction .
Whether or not a claim is actually true depends upon the quality
and quantity of evidence supporting it . Because evidence is
always limited we never know for sure whether a claim is ab-
solutely correct or absolutely false. (Oliver and Shaver, 1966, p.
110)
Based on what evidence is available we may refer to a knowledge claim as a
fact, probably true, false, beyond reasonable doubt, probably false, and
doubtful or controversial. It is this problem of ascertaining what a knowledge
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claim's status is which helps in the clarification public issues . Thus, we can
easily see how the problem of induction enters into the handling of value
conflicts. Unless one is reasonably sure of the factual areas in a disagreement
then the value conflict cannot go to another level . Oliver and Shaver seem to
be working in a kind of empirical framwork when talking of this problem,
and the hypothetico-deductive model for explanation is the one used. The
idea of never attaining perfect certainty and also of a gradient of confidence
is common to both the Harvard materials and what has been called the
hypothetico-deductive approach in this paper.
In the AEP materials, the problem of ascertaining the status of a
knowledge claim is brought out when the student is asked questions con-
cerning the facts of a case . This is done before the student is asked questions
concerned with valuation and normative standards . This then is where the
inductive problem enters into the Harvard materials. It is not referred to as
such though. It might have been better if they had simply dropped the use of
the term induction, at least as it was used, and replaced it with the term
discovery. The way the Harvard Social Studies Project materials used the
word induction simply seemed to add confusion . It is almost as if the term
induction was used solely on the basis of its popularity . The materials do
though deal with the problem of drawing conclusions from the premises in an
inductive inference, they simply do not label the problem as a logical one .
SUMMARY
We have now viewed induction, and how it was used in some of the new
social studies materials. The only conclusion that one can come to is that
presentations of the inductive problem vary widely . Another conclusion
might be that almost all of the programs could have done a better job in
dealing with inductive problem. If programs are going to call themselves
inductive, and utilize inductive inferences, then they ought to acknowledge,
and cope with, the problem of the verification of inductive conclusions . Also
students should be introduced to the nature, and attempted solutions, of this
problem. To not do this, is to fall into a trap which has ensared many
educators . Picking up a title of a method and tacking it on things which are
quite different from the original . Educators are often very guilty of believing
in some type of verbal magic . At times we do not seem to care as much about
what we are doing as we do about whether or not it sounds good. Induction is
not immune to this ailment .
All of the projects in the new social studies identified induction as being
the type of argument which goes from a set of specific premises to a general
conclusion. This is quite different from the way people involved in the
philosophy of science define induction . As was shown in the early part of this
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paper, induction today is regarded as a nondemonstrative ampliative in-
ference. It may be an argument whose premises are either general or specific
and whose conclusion may also be -general or specific . Most important
though is the nature of the inductive conclusion ; it is at best only
probabilistic . This is where much of the material in the new social studies is
found lacking. The nature of the conclusion is too often left in such a manner
that the student may well think that it may not be subject to change in the
future .
This brings us to another weak point in almost all the new social studies
materials-methodology . The one point which the new social studies often
proclaimed the loudest "We teach the methods of social science, not just
facts,"-was often the weakest point . Too little was done to explain to the
student that there are several types of methods at work in the social sciences .
Even the materials which have done the best jobs, such as the episode on
hypothesis testing, produced by the SRSS, are weak. This particular unit
almost overwhelmingly consists of techniques, with doses of methodology as
needed. Little is done to explain the difference between the two . To confuse
methodology with technique is to add confusion to an area which needs little
more .
To return to our original question : How well do the new social studies
handle induction? We might answer : "It depends." It depends on which new
programs one is talking about and even what parts within a total program .
The picture is not really bleak for some do a very good job of introducing the
student to induction . Others do a rather poor job . Still others seem to call
their programs inductive because it is a fashionable term .
Why should the student become aware of the inductive problem?
At this point some people might be asking : Why must the student be
aware of the inductive problem? If the scientist seems to be little bothered by
it, as some claim, then why must teachers and students be concerned with
Hume's formulation of the inductive problem? Essentially there are two
reasons for this and each of these will be briefly developed . In no way does
the order in which they are given reflect the order of importance attached to
them. I am sure each person will see them in a different order and this is
quite acceptable .
The Inductive Problem is a Problem in
Social- Scientific Inquiry and Should
Therefore be a part of Inquiry Training
The new social studies placed a great deal of emphasis on the teaching of
how the social scientist operates rather than on what he has discovered and
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written about. There was more stress placed on the process of social-scientific
inquiry than simply on the product . In this process the social scientist is
confronted with the inductive problem whenever he attempts to formulate a
generalization. They essentially have two ways of coping with this problem
depending on the mode of explanation they are using ; i.e., functionalist or
empirical. In a functionalist explanation it is assumed that nature is uniform
and orderly . (There is, as was earlier demonstrated, no way of proving this .) If
one is working within an empirical framework, and using a hypothetico-
deductive model, then one assumes that the answer, or hypothesis, is ten-
tative and can never be absolutely true . In either case the social scientist is
confronted with a methodological problem. Thus, if the student is to learn
how the social scientist procedes within the context of validation he must
confront this problem .
Not to introduce the student to the problem of induction, and some of the
attempted solutions, is to shortchange the student . It is to say that one is
teaching social-scientific methodology, when in reality one is doing no such
thing. This type of activity (pretending to do something when you really are
not) has been seen quite often in the past. It has also been greatly criticized in
the past, and rightly so. We are now in the situation of allowing the same
thing to happen to social-scientific inquiry approaches in the new social
studies . Teachers must be aware of standard scientific methodology, and not
allow themselves to blindly teach the rote application of techniques . They
must fully understand, and communicate to the student, methodological
problems .
The Teaching of the Inductive Problem
May Foster a Spirit of Inquiry
The student is too often given answers to questions he has not formulated,
or questions which he could care less about . One of the supposed advantages
of the inquiry, or discovery approach, is that it allows the student to for-
mulate his problems and work them through utilizing inductive methods .
This usually results in the student being more motivated, since he can
become more involved in the search for a probable answer . All this should
happen, we hope, through the utilization of inquiry strategies . More than
likely this will prove to be true, but only if we actually have the student work
with inductive methodology and not prearranged puzzle games .
There is a definite tendency for the materials to allow the student to
inquire only so far but that he can not avoid coming up with the right answer .
This was the situation in the episode on family size, produced by the
Sociological Resources for the Social Studies, which was examined earlier .
The path of inquiry, in that case, was prearranged to such an extent that the
student could hardly miss being hit over the head with the conclusions of the
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authors. The student will not get a spirit of inquiry from this type of material .
Rather, he will probably become as bored with this material as he has been
with the traditional textbook ; the one which contains all the right answers in
the teacher's edition .
Much better is the episode on hypothesis testing, also produced by SRSS .
Here there is no prearranged conclusion which the student must understand .
Rather, he learns some of the ways in which the social scientist goes about
obtaining reliable knowledge about society and its institutions. From this
type of materials the student should acquire an appreciation of the fact that
not all the answers are to be found in colored ink in the teacher's edition of
the text . The student may also come to understand that not all questions can
be answered with definitive answers . If the student gains an appreciation of
the fact there is no guarantee that empirical phenomenona will continue into
the future, as they have in the past, then he may not be so anxious about right
answers . Hopefully the student will develop a critical attitude toward all
knowledge claims, and he will also be better prepared to evaluate and weigh
the varying evidence. All of this should result in a less dogmatic attitude on
the student's part toward his own, and others, knowledge claims . This is not
to say that he should always take the position of the extreme skeptic ; rather,
he must learn to walk the narrow path between the chasms of overskepticism
and dogmatism .
Up to this point the discussion has been centered on the student . Another
benefit that might arise by improving the material is that the teacher will also
become more critically minded. In order for this to happen the materials
must realistically cope with the inductive problem. Some teachers are
dogmatic. Often the materials these teachers work with encourages the
notion that the teacher knows the facts and all of the answers to every varying
claim that might occur in the classroom . After all if the experts admit that
generalizations based on limited evidence are difficult to make, then perhaps
the classroom teacher will find it easier to admit he also is fallible . In a unit
such as the one on hypothesis-testing the teacher is no better off than the
students; both are immersed in the problems of methodology . Both are
confronted with the problem of inductive knowledge . Hopefully both student
and teacher will become more critically minded when dealing with
knowledge claims. Both may develop a more skeptical attitude towards
knowledge claims, thus becoming more critically minded about society, and
also social scientific procedures in general .
The problem of induction is real. This is attested to solely by the fact that
so many people have attempted solutions since David Hume first presented
the problem . It is also an extremely difficult problem, as demonstrated by the
fact no one has yet found a widely accepted solution . Also, the inductive
problem is of concern to the social scientist as evidenced by the different
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types of methodological solutions which allow one to circumvent the
problem : A postulate holding nature to be uniform in functional ex-
planations, and the always tentative nature of the hypotheses in empirical
explanations . If one of the aspects of the social studies is that they should in
some way acquaint the student with the process of social-scientific inquiry,
then, the inductive problem becomes important for the social studies .
The first requirement is that social studies educators become aware of
what induction is . Rather than defining induction as simply going from a set
of specific premises to a generalized conclusion, the nondemonstrative
nature of induction must be made more explicit . Then more programs must
point out how certain modes of explanation work with this problem in their
operations. From these two steps the student will hopefully achieve a much
greater awareness of the immense problems involved in stating inductive
conclusions .
The student will likewise become more aware of the complexity of
methodological problems if materials are developed which give the inductive
problem more prominence . Students using material of this sort may come to
be less dogmatic in their conclusions regarding matters of knowledge .
Today's students will undoubtly see a great many knowledge claims revised,
and overthrown, in their lifetimes . Today's student must be flexible for
tomorrow. The new social studies, or the post-new social studies, must aid
the student in achieving this flexibility . We are running a great risk with the
new materials if we will not allow for this flexibility. We may be guilty of
presenting the new materials in the same straightforward way as the old (here
is a problem, find the solution). By explaining exactly how difficult it is to
verify a knowledge claim concerning the future, or unexamined cases, it will
be possible to accomplish the goals set out above . The problem of induction
is real, it is tough, and it is not being handled by the new social studies as well
as it could be . Work must now be done on seeing that better efforts are made
in including the inductive problem into the new social studies .
54
FOOTNOTES
'In spite of all of the aclaim Professor Kuhn has received for his notions regarding paradigms
and paradigm shifts his more fruitful contribution may well be his demonstration of the social
and psychological foundations of scientific explanation . In this respect "Kuhn provides a
necessary stimulus and a welcome challenge to the logician's theories of science ." Ian I .
Mitroff, "The Mythology of Methodology," Theory and Decision, 2 (1972), pp . 278 .
2"It must be observed that this time-characteristic of inductive inference, which is sometimes
mentioned in the definition of it, is of no essential importance, and that induction may also
proceed from past cases to other unexamined instances belonging to the past." Georg Henrik
vonWright, The Logical Problem ofInduction, 2nd ed . rev ., (London : Basil Blackwell, 1957), p .
1 .
3A rather easily comprehended summary of Bayes Theorem may be found in Likelihood, pp . 41-
51, by A.W.T. Edwards, (London, Cambridge, 1972).
4A similar statement is found in Clarifying Public Controversy: An Approach to Teaching Social
Studies, (Boston : Little, Brown and Co ., 1970), p . 239 . "For the most part the teacher should
use an inductive approach by stimulating and guiding the student in reaching his own con-
clusions, rather than transmitting to the student conclusions that the teacher has previously
determined to be correct ."
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A STUDY OF THE PERCEPTIONS OF NEW JERSEY EDUCATORS
REGARDING NATIONALISTIC INSTRUCTION*
David T. Naylor
Cranford Senior High School
Rutgers University
"The new social studies," less concerned with the transmission of
traditional factual knowledge and more concerned with the processes in-
volved in identifying and dealing with matters of significance to the in-
dividual student, present a dilemma to the social studies teacher . That
dilemma, concisely described by Dale Brubaker in Alternative Directions for
the Social Studies, finds the social studies teacher in a situation where the
tradition of nationalistic instruction in the public schools seemingly con-
tradicts the premises on which much of "the new social studies" is based .
One of the major concerns of the social studies has long been that of
citizenship education . Although, particularly within the past decade, con-
siderable debate has developed with regard to the nature and relationship of
citizenship education to the social studies, and despite its somewhat
nebulous character, citizenship education continues to be regarded as one of
the principal concerns of the field, particularly by those involved with the
public schools .
Frequently citizenship education is narrowly perceived as a means of
imparting the "right values," of developing a strong, oftentimes
unquestioning allegiance to the nation . Such a conception of citizenship
education should, however, be more properly regarded as nationalistic in-
struction. For nationalistic instruction, that instruction designed to instill
love and respect for one's country, consists both of the encouragement and
cultivation of certain ideas, attitudes and practices considered supportive or
pro-national, and the discouragement and prohibition of certain ideas, at-
titudes and practices considered non-supportive or contra-national . Such
instruction is concerned with studying national history in a sympathetic or
"patriotic" manner, respecting national symbols, celebrating special events
and heroes, singing special songs, reading special addresses, and developing
an adherence to certain chosen principles .
Fostering closed as opposed to open induction, nationalistic instruction
emphasizes the importance of pre-determined outcomes . As Jack L . Nelson
observed :
The result of a tradition of nationalistic education which
emphasizes controlled textbooks, curricula and teachers is a cult
*This study was supported by the Center for Social Education, Rutgers University .
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of nationalism without inquiry-indoctrination to pro-
nationalism and against anything viewed by powerful pressure
groups as contra-national (Nelson, 1969, p . 14) .
Nationalistic instruction lacks an inquiry orientation for it does not permit
the student to seek "truth" but rather permits him to "discover" that
discrete subject matter considered most appropriate for good citizenship .
A number of studies attest to the existence and the extent of nationalistic
instruction in the public schools . Investigations of state legislative control of
the curriculum by Flanders (1925), Pierce (1926), Beale (1936), Brudney
(1941), Nelson (1968) and Sadler (1968) point to the extent to which
legislators have sought to indoctrinate with requirements for specific courses
to be taught, specific topics to be discussed and even specific outcomes to be
attained. Analyses of textbooks by Beale (1936), Pierce (1930), Billington
(1966), Noah, Prince and Riggs (1962), England (1963) and Nelson and
Roberts (1963) reveal the decidedly pro-national content of textbooks used in
the public schools . Works dealing with restrictions on and actions taken
against public school educators such as those of Beale (1941), Pierce (1926)
and Zeigler (1969), as well as those dealing with the impact of pressure
groups on the school including Beale (1936, 1941), Pierce (1933), Gellerman
(1938), Raup (1936) and Nelson and Roberts (1963) offer additional
testimony . And, the overall dominance of a pro-national, emotionally-
oriented thrust is further affirmed in political socialization studies including
those of Easton and Dennis (1969), Hess and Torney (1968) and Greenstein
(1969) .
But, such an approach to citizenship education is not universally accepted .
Some, including Beale (1936, pp. 55-57), Smith and Patrick (1967, p . 116),
Hess and Torney (1968, pp . 120-32 ; 242-51), Cleary (1971, pp . 98-107),
Horton (1963, pp. 56-57) and Jennings and Niemi (1968, 177-78), have
suggested that the outcomes of nationalistic instruction may not be effective
citizenship at all but rather defective citizenship for such instruction may
lead to ethnocentrism, apathy, political naivete, cynicism, excessive con-
formity and authoritarianism .
What is called for is a different conception of citizenship education, a
more vigilant, inquiring and dynamic type of citizenship education quite
apart from the conception inherent in nationalistic instruction . As Jack L.
Nelson has written :
. . . any ideas, interpretations, and concepts are open to inquiry in
a rational and forthright manner . This would not exclude
education about heroic events and individuals nor agreement on
the nature, intents and identification of national enemies . It does
not however, mandate or imply that decisions in these areas are
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made for and taught to students . Instead, students would be
considered free, with dignity and rights, capable of contributing
to and dealing with social change . The role of schools in this form
of nationalistic education would be to provide students with
analytic and synthesizing tools with which data, attitudes, and
other types of evidence can be weighed (Nelson, 1969, p . 4).
As attested to by Smith and Patrick (1967, pp . 105-27), Massialas and Cox
(1966), Oliver and Shaver (1966), Hunt and Metcalf (1968) and Engle (1964,
pp. 28-34), it is this kind of citizenship education which is very much a part of
"the new social studies."
THE PROBLEM
The problem is thus both theoretical and practical-theoretical as to the
character of nationalistic education and practical as to the nature of in-
struction the school will permit . Are nationalism and patriotism closed areas
or is an open examination of those areas possible in the public schools?
The crucial factor seems to be the public school educators themselves .
They must make judgments about both the nature of the school and the
nature of the curriculum. Yet, while there is a significant body of literature
with respect to legislation, school regulations, textbooks, pressure groups,
and teacher restrictions, relatively little information exists with respect to
how public school educators perceive the school with regard to nationalistic
education . Harmon Zeigler's observation, "We know something about what
students think ought to happen in class, but very little about what teachers
think ought to happen" (Zeigler, 1969, p . 95), is particularly applicable to
this question .
Do public school educators perceive the school as receptive to open inquiry
in areas involving nationalistic education? Do they feel that the school should
be more receptive to such inquiry than it is at the present time? These are
crucial questions ; they serve as the basis of this investigation .
HYPOTHESES
Both Beale (1941, pp . 237-44) and Zeigler (1969, 93-143) have advised that
educators hold views or positions apart from the views or positions held by
the school and are inhibited in their expression of such views . Studies dealing
with the school and the treatment of controversial issues such as those of
Lunstrum (1964, pp . 178-86) and McAulay (1969, 326-30) have pointed to
teacher reluctance to deal with controversy. Greenstein (1969, 31-35), Hess
and Torney (1968, pp . 120-32; 242), Easton and Dennis (1969, pp . 273-85)
and Cleary (1971, 129-39) have suggested that the elementary school is
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particularly prone to nationalistic instruction . Spindler's speculations about
the personal characteristics of educators (Spindler, 1963, pp . 132-47) and
Waller's observations with respect to the institutional characteristics of
schools (Waller, 1967, pp . 375-416) further confirm and suggest reasons for
the existence of a lack of openness in the school environment .
Thus it is clear that a significant body of literature exists suggesting that
the school is inhospitable to open inquiry, particularly when dealing with
aspects of nationalistic education . It is on the basis of such literature and the
author's ten years of experience as a teacher in the public schools that the
following hypotheses were generated .
The major hypothesis of this study was that New Jersey suburban school
educators would perceive that the school would act in a significantly less
tolerant way than they would perceive the school should act in situations
involving aspects of nationalistic instruction . Other hypotheses were
generated using the following variables : (1) school district ; (2) position in the
school ; (3) length of experience in education ; (4) tenure; and, (5) highest
degree attained .
Hypothesis #1 : New Jersey suburban school educators would
perceive that the school would act in a significantly less tolerant
way than they would perceive the school should act in situations
involving aspects of nationalistic instruction .
Hypothesis #2: Public school educators in one school district
would not differ significantly from those in the other three school
districts either in their perceptions of how the school would act or
how the school should act in situations involving aspects of
nationalistic instruction .
Hypothesis #3: Administrators and secondary (9-12) school
teachers would differ significantly from elementary (K-8) school
teachers in their perceptions of how the school would act in
situations involving aspects of nationalistic instruction . Ad-
ministrators and elementary school teachers would differ
significantly from secondary school teachers in their perceptions
of how the school should act in these situations .
Hypothesis #4 : Public school educators with from ten to twenty
and those with over twenty years of experience would differ
significantly from public school educators with from one to three
and from four to nine years of experience in education in both
their perceptions of how the school would act and in their per-
ceptions of how the school should act in situations involving
aspects of nationalistic instruction .
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Hypothesis #5 : Public school educators with tenure would differ
significantly from public school educators without tenure in both
their perceptions of how the school would act and in their per-
ceptions of how the school should act in situations involving
aspects of nationalistic instruction .
Hypothesis #6 : Public school educators with bachelor degrees
would differ significantly from public school educators with
master degrees in both their perceptions of how the school would
act and should act in situations involving aspects of nationalistic
instruction .
PROCEDURE
A situational questionnaire was devised with the intent of ascertaining the
perceptions of public school educators in situations having nationalistic bias .
Derived from an extensive literature survey, the questionnaire contained
seventeen situations involving aspects of nationalistic instruction and the
public schools .
The questionnaire was sent to two hundred fifty-eight randomly selected
public school educators in four New Jersey suburban school districts . Each
school district included grades K-12 under one board of education and was
located within a forty mile radius of New York City . For each situation two
responses were required. Each educator was asked first to indicate what he
perceived would occur in his school district and then what he perceived
should occur in each situation . On a five-point skewed scale-i .e., no zero
point-responses ranged in identifiable behavior from that which would be
considered less tolerant or less open to that which would be considered more
tolerant or more open . Hence, an overall score of seventeen represented an
extremely intolerant or closed position whereas an overall score of eighty-five
represented an extremely tolerant or open position .
The data were analyzed with a series of analysis of variance tests. When a
significant F ratio at the .05 level was found, Scheffe's post hoc test for
significant contrasts was employed . A total of two hundred and thirty-seven
(92%) of the public school educators responded, although only one hundred
and ninety-two (74%) actually completed the entire questionnaire . The
disparity between responses and completed questionnaires is attributable to
fourteen educators (5%) who failed to complete the questionnaire properly
and thirty-one (12%) educators who chose not to participate in the study .
RESULTS
Table 1 contains the means and standard deviations of both "would" and
"should" responses for all respondents .
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TABLE 1
Means and Standard Deviations for all Respondents
Table 2 indicates that a significant difference did exist in what educators
perceived would occur in their school and what they felt should occur in
situations involving aspects of nationalistic instruction .
TABLE 2
Analysis of Variance for all Respondents
*Indicates significance at p < .01 .
Table 3 contains the means and standard deviations for the various in-
dependent variables .
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Source of
Variation
df Sum of
Squares
Mean
Square
F
Between 1 11,386.15 11,386 .15 89.76*
Within 382 48,456 .08 126.85
Total 383 59,842.23
Response N Mean
Standard
Deviation
Would 192 55.59 11 .43
Should 192 66.48 11 .09
TABLE 3
Means and Standard Deviations for
Various Independent Variables
*Four educators were excluded since two had attained a Doctor's degree and
two did not possess a Bachelor's degree.
Table 4 shows a summary of analysis of variance tests for the various
independent variables .
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Group Variable
Would
N
	
Mean S.D .
Should
Mean S.D .
By School District
District A 56 54.77 13.02 66.30 12.78
District B 35 53.20 11.14 65.11 12.05
District C 50 55.80 10.58 65.60 10.51
District D 51 57.55 10.58 68.59 9.08
By Position
Administrator 23 60.70 9.55 65.43 10.90
Elementary Teacher 79 52.25 11 .60 64.43 12.37
Secondary Teacher 90 57.22 10.93 68.56 9.60
By Length of Experience
1-3 Years 42 52.40 11 .82 68.52 8.89
4-9 Years 54 53.00 10.86 67.89 12.08
10-20 Years 62 60.16 9.44 67.90 8.94
Over 20 Years 34 54.74 12.10 59.29 12.63
By Tenure
Non-Tenured 56 52.73 11 .06 68.02 9.36
Tenured 136 56.51 11.29 66.00 11.52
By Degree*
Bachelor's Degree 94 53.29 10.93 65.67 10.53
Master's Degree 94 57.23 12.39 68.03 11 .08
TABLE 4
Summary of Analysis of Variance Tests
for Various Independent Variables
The results of these tests confirmed the hypothesis that there were no
significant differences in the perceptions of public school educators on the
basis of school district . Public school educators in one school district did not
differ significantly from public school educators in the other three school
districts either in their perceptions of how the school would act or how the
school should act in these situations .
For the other four variables, however, significant differences in perception
did occur . When asked to respond to the question, "In your school system,
which of the following would most likely occur?", significant differences
appeared on the basis of position held in the school district, length of ex-
perience in education, tenure, and highest degree attained .
The hypothesis with respect to position in the school district was con-
firmed. There were significant differences in the perceptions of ad-
ministrators, secondary school teachers and elementary school teachers . Use
of the Scheffe post hoc procedure to test for significant contrasts revealed
that both administrators and secondary school teachers perceived the school
would act in a significantly more tolerant manner in situations involving
aspects of nationalistic instruction than did elementary school teachers .
Significant differences were also in evidence for the variable, length of
experience in education, although the hypothesis was not confirmed . While
educators with from ten to twenty years of experience in education did
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Group Variable F Ratio
(Would
F Ratio
(Should)
School District 1 .14 .89
Position 7.02* 3.09*
Experience 5.93* 6.42*
Tenure 4.52* 1 .35
Degree 5.37* 2.24
*Indicates significance at p < .05.
perceive the school as significantly more tolerant or open than educators with
less than ten years of experience, educators with more than twenty years of
experience did not .
The hypotheses with respect, to tenure and highest degree attained were
also confirmed . Public school educators with tenure perceived that the school
would act in a significantly more tolerant way than did those educators
without tenure and public school educators with master degrees perceived
the school would act in a significantly more tolerant way than did those
educators with only bachelor degrees .
When asked to respond to the question, "In your opinion, which of the
following should occur?", significant differences in perceptions were ob-
served only on the basis of position held in the school district and length of
experience in education . On the basis of tenure and highest degree attained,
significant differences in perception of how the school should act in these
situations did not appear. Thus, the hypotheses for the latter two variables
were not confirmed.
While significant differences in perception did appear on the basis of
position held in the school district, the hypothesis was not confirmed, for
both administrators and secondary school teachers perceived the , school
should act in a significantly more tolerant manner than did elementary
school teachers . Likewise, while significant differences in perception of how
the school should act in these situations were evident on the basis of length of
experience in education, the hypothesis was not confirmed . Educators with
less than twenty years of experience perceived the school should be more
tolerant in these situations than those with more than twenty years of ex-
perience .
Thus, position held in the school district did produce significant dif-
ferences in the perceptions of public school educators . Both administrators
and secondary school teachers perceived the school would be and should be
significantly more tolerant or open than did elementary school teachers .
Length of experience was also a significant variable for both "would" and
"should" responses . But, while educators with less than ten years of ex-
perience perceived the school would be significantly less open or tolerant in
these situations than did educators with from ten to twenty years of ex-
perience and perceived the school should be significantly more open or
tolerant than did educators with more than twenty years of experience, they
did not significantly differ with all educators having more than ten years of
experience for both "would" and "should" responses as had been
hypothesized .
Public school educators with tenure perceived that the school would act in
a significantly more tolerant way than did educators without tenure but no
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significant differences were discerned in their perceptions of how the school
should act in these situations . And, while public school educators with
master degrees perceived the school would act in a significantly more tolerant
way than did public school educators with only bachelor degrees, no
significant differences appeared in their perceptions of how the school should
act in these situations .
DISCUSSION
The major hypothesis-there would be a significant difference in what
public school educators perceived would occur and what they perceived
should occur in situations involving aspects of nationalistic instruction-was
confirmed . Not only is the mean of all respondents, as shown in Table 1,
higher for their "should" response, but, without exception, as shown in
Table 3, the mean of every group's "should" response is higher than its
respective "would" response. This suggests that, indeed, public school
educators do not perceive the school as being as open or tolerant as they
perceive it should be .
The results of the current study support the observations of both Beale
(1941) and Zeigler (1969) that educators hold views or positions apart from
those held by the school and are inhibited in the expression of their views . As
indicated by the disparity in "would" and "should" responses for situations
involving aspects of nationalistic instruction, the public school is not par-
ticularly hospitable to open inquiry in areas of nationalism and patriotism,
certainly not as hospitable as public school educators perceived it should be .
Studies dealing with the school and the treatment of controversial issues
have suggested that teachers are reluctant to deal with controversy . Not only
might this be attributable to an inability to recognize the debatable nature of
the "truths" teachers propound, but these studies, such as those of Lunstrum
(1964) and McAulay (1969), suggested that such reluctance is due to : (1) a
prevalent belief among both the general public and educators themselves
that the school should function as a transmission agency reinforcing the
status quo; (2) uncertainty, confusion and feelings of inadequacy on the part
of educators in dealing with controversial issues ; and (3) the threat of sanc-
tions from inside or outside the school .
The findings of this study lend support to such studies, particularly with
respect to the fear of sanctions whether those sanctions be real or perceived .
It appears that public school educators do perceive the school to be more
restrictive than it should be . If, indeed, one's perception of reality is more
important than reality itself as sociologist W .I. Thomas suggested in his
statement, "if men define situations as real, they are real in their con-
sequences" (in Merton, 1968, p . 475), then one would expect to find the
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school reflecting more of a closed than an open inquiry approach, at least in
the area of nationalistic instruction . That is, one would expect to find the
school reflecting more of the "would" perceptions rather than the "should"
perceptions with educators acting accordingly .
In further analysis of the independent variables, significant differences
were found to exist on the basis of position in the school district . Not only did
elementary school teachers perceive the school to be significantly less tolerant
than either secondary school teachers or administrators, but, when queried
as to what the school should do in these situations, the responses of
elementary school teachers were significantly less tolerant than secondary
school teachers and administrators . This suggests that the elementary school
may be less open than the secondary school, less willing to entertain
disparate views . Thus, curricula which seek a more critical examination of
society at the elementary school level must face the reality of reluctance on
the part of elementary teachers to entertain a critical examination of the
status quo in their classrooms, at least as it affects aspects of nationalistic
instruction .
Findings with respect to experience in education are also instructive . It
appears that public school educators with less experience are more likely to
perceive the school as being less tolerant or less open than public school
educators with more experience in education . Educators with less than ten
years of experience did perceive the school to be significantly less tolerant
than educators with from ten to twenty years of experience, though this was
true of educators with more than twenty years of experience as well . When
asked what they perceived the school should do in these situations, educators
with less than twenty-one years of experience perceived the school should be
significantly more tolerant than those with more than twenty years of ex-
perience . And, it should be noted that non-tenured educators perceived the
school as significantly less tolerant than tenured educators, although no
significant differences appeared in their perceptions of what the school
should do in these situations . Hence, while the findings are not altogether
clear here, they do suggest some support for Willard Waller's observation as
to the effects of the school environment on public school educators .
When the teacher has internalized the rules which bind him, he
has become truly a teacher . . . . When conformity is the most
natural thing for him, and he conforms without thought, the
teacher is free, for freedom is only an optical illusion that results
from our inability to see the restrictions that surround us (Waller,
1967, p. 420) .
This study has attempted to provide further insight into the perceptions of
public school educators in terms of what they perceive the schools are and
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what they perceive the school should be, particularly as those perceptions
relate to inquiry in areas involving nationalistic instruction . If, as Donald
Oliver and James Shaver have contended, students are to be "allowed wide
lattitude in developing their own standards and tastes-i .e., their own
definitions of human dignity" rather than be forced to accept "some agreed-
upon substantive definition of right" (Oliver and Shaver, 1966, p . 13), they
must be able to freely inquire into topics and situations as basic as those
involving aspects of nationalism and patriotism . However, the findings of
this study suggest some of the difficulties that confront attempts to im-
plement such a curriculum based on "the new social studies," particularly at
the elementary school level . And, they may also help to explain the great
difficulty that many large social studies faculties have in agreeing on a
common curriculum or approach .
This study was limited to four New Jersey suburban K-12 school districts .
Caution, therefore, must be observed when attempting to generalize from its
findings . Yet, the finding that public school educators in each of the four
participating school districts, districts located in three different counties of
the state and subject to four different boards of education, did not differ
significantly from each other in their perceptions of what should occur in
these situations or, more importantly, in their perceptions of what would
occur in their respective school districts should be noted .
Perhaps the most important value of this study was the development and
subsequent refinement of the situational questionnaire itself . Its use in this
study was encouraging and it promises to be an instrument which can be
used with a certain degree of confidence in other locations and at other times
for these and similar purposes .
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AN INVESTIGATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT
IN MALE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL STUDENTS
Richard K. Jantz
University of Maryland
Lawrence Kohlberg and Jean Piaget have indicated that a close
relationship exists between intellectual development and moral development .
Kohlberg has contended that cognitive development is a necessary tool,
though not a sufficient condition, for moral development . He has stated that
there is a generalized maturity factor in moral development similar to a
generalized intelligence factor, and that this maturation is reflected by
different levels or stages of moral thinking (Kohlberg, 1970, p . 70-73) .
Piaget has written about the "parallelism existing between verbal and
intellectual development" (Piaget, 1965, p. 398). The structures of the in-
tellect define the level of development and determine the nature of logical
thinking on moral problems .
For Piaget a reciprocal relationship exists between moral and intellectual
development in terms of logical thought and action : "logic is the morality of
thought just as morality is the logic of action " (Piaget, 1965, p . 398). Ac-
cording to Piaget both kinds of reciprocity are evident when the intellectual
and moral egocentric natures of young children develop and "gradually yield
to the pressure of collective logical and moral laws through contact with the
judgments and evaluations of others (Piaget, 1965, p. 401)."
Piaget has identified two stages of moral development . He identified these
stages as a morality of constraint and a morality of cooperation . Relationships
of constraint are characterized by an authority of superiors and restraint by
adults. Relationships of cooperation are characterized by an authority of
equals and cooperation with peers. According to Piaget, the shift from one
level of moral thinking is very gradual and occurs somewhere between the
primary (K-3) and intermediate (4-6) grades .
Other researchers (Bandura, 1963 ; Crowley, 1968 ; Cowan, 1969 ; Hebble,
1971 ; and Costanzo, 1973) have investigated the moral judgments of young
children . Their findings lend support to Piaget's and Kohlberg's theories of
different levels of moral thinking.
Kohlberg and Piaget have indicated that a close relationship exists bet-
ween intellectual development and moral development . Research is needed
to provide additional descriptions of this relationship .
METHOD
It was the purpose of this study (1) to investigate the relationship between
intellectual development and moral development as reflected by responses to
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two specific tasks, (2) to investigate differences in responses to the in-
teractions between the intellectual and moral development tasks, and (3) to
investigate differences in grade level responses to the intellectual and moral
development tasks .
Population The population of the study was composed of seventy-two
male elementary school students . All of the students attended the same
school which was located within the beltway of the greater Washington, D .C .
metropolitan area. Twelve students, six white males and six black males,
were selected from each grade level . Four students, two black and two white,
were chosen from each of three different classrooms for each grade level .
Each classroom teacher selected the four boys from her room to be included
in the study . Only those students who had not been retained or advanced a
grade were to be selected .
Procedure The subjects in the study were individually interviewed at
the school and their responses tape recorded . Students from Grades One and
Six were interviewed on the first day, students from Grades Two and Five on
the second day, and students from Grades Three and Four on the third day .
The complete responses of each subject were typed from the tape recordings
and then analyzed . The data was collected in the spring .
The measure of intellectual development was the pupil responses to a
Piagetian conservation task. Each subject was given two balls of clay of equal
size. The subject was instructed to return one to the investigator and "roll the
other one out like a snake ." He was then asked a series of questions : (1) do
you have more clay than me? (2) do I have more clay than you? (3) do we have
the same amount of clay? and (4) why did you answer that way? On the basis
of the subject's responses he was classified as either a non-conserver (C) or a
conserver (C) . Non-conservers replied that there were unequal amounts of
clay when the size of one ball of clay was changed . Conservers (C) replied that
there was no change in amount, only in form .
The measure of moral development was the subject's responses to a
Piagetian type paired-story situation involving intentional behaviors and
final outcomes . Each student was told the two stories in the order presented .
Story 1
Two classes are playing a game to see which class could make the most
baskets. All the children in both classes have had their turn except Mike . So
far his class is losing, but if Mike can make the basket, his class will win .
Mike takes careful aim and shoots the ball with all his might . The ball goes
bouncing across the playground, and smacks a little boy in the face and
breaks his glasses .
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Story 2
Henry and his class are shooting baskets when the bell rings . The teacher
says "Recess is over, let's go back to the classroom ." Henry didn't have a
turn at shooting the ball, so when the teacher is lining up the children, Henry
kicks the ball to the far corner of the playground and someone has to go and
get it.
Each subject was then asked (1) which boy was naughtier? and (2) why do
you believe he was the naughtier? On the basis of the subject's responses he
was classified as characteristic of a morality of constraint (MC) or a morality
of cooperation (MC) . Those classified as characteristic of a morality of
constraint did not mention intention in their decisions and said Mike was the
naughtier because he broke the glasses . Those classified as characteristic of a
morality of cooperation indicated that Henry was the naughtier because his
intentions were "bad" and with Mike it was an accident .
Data Analysis
	
The design of the study suggested testing the following
null hypotheses at the .05 level of confidence :
1 .0 There is no significant relationship between responses to the
paired-story and responses to the conservation task .
2.0 There is no significant difference in grade level responses to the
paired-story .
3.0 There is no significant difference in grade level responses to the
conservation task .
4.0 There is no significant difference in grade level responses to the
interaction between the paired-story and conservation task .
The first null hypothesis employed the Phi Coefficient and was tested for
significance by using a z score conversion technique . (Glass and Stanley,
1970, p. 315). The second and third hypotheses were tested using the
ANOVA for dichotomus data with a Newman-Keuls procedure to test for
differences between grade levels . (Winer, 1962, p . 33 and 138) . The fourth
hypothesis was tested using the ANOVA for unequal N's and employed an
adaptation of the Newman-Keuls procedure for use in making tests on
differences between all pairs of means . (Winer, 1962, p. 96-102).
FINDINGS
A significant relationship (0 = . 29) was found between the subject's
responses to the paired-story situation and the conservation task . Data for
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calculating the Phi Coefficient can be found in Table 1 . Over half (n = 37) of
the total population (n = 72) were classified as characteristic both of a
morality of cooperation (MC) and a conserver (C). Seventeen percent were
classified as characteristic of both non-conserver (C) and a morality of
constraint (MC) . Other such percentages can be calculated from the data in
Table 1 .
TABLE 1
Contingency Table for Relationship Between
Responses to Paired-Story Situations and
Conservation Task
Significant differences were also found in the mean grade level responses
to the interactions between the paired-story situation and the conservation
task. (F3, 68 = 12.01) the mean grade level responses for_those characteristic
of a morality of constraint (M) and non-conservers (C) was 1.83 while a
mean grade level score of 4.35 was found for those classified as characteristic
of a morality of cooperation (MC) and conservers (C) . This difference was
significant. Significant differences were also found between other pairs .
Summary data for the mean scores and Newman-Keuls is found in Table 2 .
TABLE 2
Summary of Newman-Keuls, Means Scores, and
Numbers for the Interactions Between Responses to the
Paired-Story and Conservation Task
** Significant at the .05 level .
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Conservation Task
Paired-Story Non-conservers
(C)
Conservers
(C)
Totals
Morality of
Cooperation (MC) 15 37 52
Morality of
Constraint (MC) 12 8 20
Totals 27 45 72
Inter- Mean
actions (MC-C) (MC-C) (MC-C) (MC-C) Numbers Scores
(MC-C) * * * * 12 1 .83
(MC-C) * * 8 2.25
(MC-C) 15 3.40
(MC-C) 37 4.35
Other scores can be calculated from the data in Table 2 . The mean grade
level score for those classified as characteristic of a morality of constraint was
2.00 while the mean score was 2 .70 for those classified as non-conservers . A
mean score of 3.98 was found for those classified as conservers and a mean
score of 4 .08 for those who were characteristic of a morality of cooperation .
When responses were compared by grade levels, significant differences
were found in reactions to both the paired-story situation (F5, 55 = 7 .5) and
the conservation task (F5, 55 = 2 .67) . Responses of pupils to the paired-story
in Grades Four, Five, and Six clustered together and were significantly
different from those in Grades One and Two . Grade Five responses to the
conservation task were significantly different from Grade One responses. No
significant differences were found between other grade level pairs. Summary
data for the Newman-Keuls is found in Table 3 .
TABLE 3
Summary of Newman-Keuls for Grade Level Variation in
Responses to Paired-Story and
Conservation Task
Paired-Story
	
Conservation Task
Grade
Level 1 2 3 6 4 5 1 2 3 4 6 5
1 ** ** ** 1 **
2
3 3
6 4
4 6
**Significant at the 0.5 level .
DISCUSSION
The results of this investigation lend support to the contention that a
positive relationship exists between intellectual development and moral
development, . but that those characteristic of the higher level of intellectual
** ** ** 2
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development are not necessarily the same ones reflecting a higher level of
moral thinking .
Piaget has indicated that a shift from non-conserving to conserving
behavior occurs somewhere between the primary and intermediate grades .
He has also indicated that a shift in the level of moral thinking occurs ap-
proximately between those grades . From this one might expect those
classified as characteristic of a morality of constraint to be non-conservers
and those categorized as typical of a morality of cooperation to be conservers .
Sixty-eight percent of the population under study followed that pattern .
Approximately one-third had one attribute, but not the other . Forty-four
percent of those classified as non-conservers were also classified as typical of
a morality of constraint . Seventy-one percent of those classified as charac-
teristic of a morality of cooperation were also classified as conservers .
Grade level differences were also found in responses to the two tasks .
There were more significant differences between paired grade levels for the
moral development task than the conservation task. For the moral
development situation statistical significant differences were found between
pupils in Grades Four, Five, and Six, and pupils in Grade One and Two . For
the intellectual development task, statistical significance was found only
between Grade Five and Grade One. This may suggest that responses to
moral questions are more polarized in the elementary school than are
responses to conservation tasks . The difference between mean grade level
scores for morality of constraint and morality of cooperation responses was
2.1 while the difference was 1 .3 between non-conservers and conserver
responses .
The relationships between intellectual development and moral develop-
ment are not clearly defined, but do seem to exist . Questions then arise as to
whether moral judgments can be integrated into intellectual developmental
tasks to facilitate both intellectual and moral growth . For example could
moral judgments become an integral part of teaching time and chronological
concepts or the different aspects of critical thinking? Research is needed to
determine if focusing on moral development also enhances intellectual
development, or if an emphasis on intellectual developmental tasks can also
enhance moral thinking . Can the integration of intellectual and moral
thinking lead to productive decision-making? Further research is needed
along these lines to assist those involved in curriculum development for
young children .
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HARTOONIAN, H. MICHAEL, "A Disclosure Approach to Value Analysis
in Social Studies Education : Rationale and Components," Theory and Re-
search in Social Education, I, 1 (Fall, 1973), pp. 1-25 .
This paper presents a rationale for an approach to value study which takes
account of the subjective nature and symbolic activities of human beings .
Growing out of this rationale, a model for value study is developed through a
consideration of the distinctions which exist between value and non-value
concepts ; the nature of narrative (explanation) language ; and the nature of
man as a mythologizer and future gazer. Central to the approach developed
here is the need to discriminate between disclosure and non-disclosure
concepts . Value concepts are disclosure in nature, and, as such, cannot be
examined in the same way one would study non-value concepts. Also, the
nature of language with such attributes as metaphoric thought, narrative
style and mythic structures is considered as an integral part of this disclosure
appraoch. This paper calls for a conscious development of a more holistic
approach to value study. While it does not posit a systematic repression or
rejction of objectivism or materialism, it does call attention to the need for a
more careful balance between materialistic and mentalistic models in un-
derstanding hu ..ian values .
NEWTON, RICHARD F., "Induction in the New Social Studies," Theory
and Research in Social Education, I,1 (Fall, 1973), pp. 27-57 .
One of the problems that the New Social Studies was supposed to avoid
was the certainty which students attach to knowledge . This was to be done
through the utilization of inductive procedures . The problem was that little
attention was paid to the nature of the logical problem raised by David
Hume. Essentially the problem concerns the making of accurate predictions
based on past experience . It is logically impossible to do so. Few of the
materials and writers in the sixties dealt with this problem . Even more
serious was the limiting of induction only to those inferences which go from a
particular set of premises to a general conclusion . A far more accurate
definition is that induction is a non-demonstrative inference whose con-
clusion is ampliative . A deductive inference is one, which is demonstrative
and whose conclusion is non-ampliative . Thus, the source of difference
between an inductive and deductive inference is the property of truth
preservation.
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The social organization, climate, cohesion of schools and other school
characteristics as independent, explanatory variables predicting to
general educational achievement.
The areas listed should neither be construed as exhaustive nor restrictive .
The journal is a vehicle to increase communication about social education
among social educators, curriculum developers, social scientists,
philosophers and historians in addition to providing a means for serious and
systematic communication between other professional educators . The
journal will attempt to capitalize on the virtues of eclecticism, in that
professional social studies educators will benefit from insights on schooling
and education that spring from different disciplines and perspectives. In-
sofar as possible the vices of eclecticism, including diffuse and non-relevant
writing, will be avoided by maintaining the focus of the journal clearly on
social education albeit broadly construed . Where applicable authors should
consider developing practical exemplars that illustrate their arguments, but
this is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for accepting or rejecting
manuscripts. All manuscripts submitted will be anonymously reviewed by
two referees .
Form for Submission of Manuscripts
In order to facilitate the processing of manuscripts, authors are asked to
follow the procedures noted below :
1) Manuscripts should be typed with a dark black ribbon, clearly
mimeographed, or multilithed . Authors should avoid submitting ditto copies
of articles unless clearly legible. Some corrections in dark ink will be ac-
cepted. Copies containing numerous corrections will be returned for
retyping .
2) Three copies of each mansucript should be submitted . This will speed
up the reviewing process and guard against loss of manuscripts .
3) Everything should be double-spaced including footnotes and
references .
4) Since manuscripts will be sent out anonymously for reviewing and due
to the fact that the abstracts will be published, the author's name and af-
filiations along with an abstract of approximately 150 words in length not
exceeding 200 words should appear on a separate covering page . Information
identifying the author, position, and institutional affiliation should appear
on a separate page.
5) Manuscripts will be considered for publication that range in length
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NAYLOR, DAVID T., "A Study of the Perceptions of New Jersey Educators
Regarding Nationalistic Instruction," Theory and Research in Social
Education, I, 1 (Fall, 1973) pp. 59-73 .
"The new social studies" present a dilemma to the teacher for he is
confronted with a tradition of nationalistic instruction which seemingly
contradicts the premises on which much of "the new social studies" is based .
Do educators perceive the school as receptive to open inquiry in areas in-
volving nationalistic education? Do they perceive the school should be more
receptive to such inquiry? The major hypothesis was that N.J. suburban
school educators would perceive the school would act in a significantly less
tolerant way than it should act in situations involving aspects of nationalistic
instruction . Differences were hypothesized for both "would" and "should"
perceptions for several independent variables . A situational questionnaire
was devised and sent to educators in four N .J . suburban, K-12, school
districts. Data were analyzed with analysis of variance tests, using Scheffe's
post hoc test for significant contrasts . The data confirmed the major
hypothesis. Educators did perceive the school differently, both in terms of
what it would do and what it should do in these situations . Implying the
school is not hospitable to open inquiry, the findings suggested some of the
difficulties that confront attempts to implement a curriculum based on "the
new social studies," particularly with respect to nationalistic instruction .
JANTZ, RICHARD K., "An Investigation of the Relationship Between
Moral Development and Intellectual Development in Male Elementary
School Students," Theory and Research in Social Education I, 1 (Fall,
1973) pp. 75-81 .
It was the purpose of this study (1) to investigate the relationship between
intellectual development and moral development as reflected by responses to
two specific tasks, (2) to investigate differences in responses to the in-
teractions between the intellectual and moral development tasks, and (3) to
investigate differences in grade level responses to the intellectual and moral
development tasks . The measure of intellectual development was the pupil
responses to a Piagetian type conservation task. The measure of moral
development was the subject's responses to a Piagetian type paired-story
situation involving intentional behaviors and final outcomes. Seventy-two
male elementary school pupils, twelve from each grade, were included in the
study. A significant relationship was found to exist between the two tasks,
and significant differences were found within the interaction of the two tasks .
The mean grade level responses for those characteristic of both a morality of
constraint and non-conserving behavior was 1 .83 while a mean grade level
score of 4.35 was found for those classified as characteristic of both a
morality of cooperation and conservers . Significant grade level differences
were also found in responses to the two tasks .
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from approximately 15 to 50 double-spaced typewritten pages although there
is no minimum length on articles that will be reviewed and published .
6) No responsibility is assumed for loss or injury to manuscripts submitted
for publication .
Manuscript Style
1) When citations are made, the author's name, publication date, and
page (where necessary) should be enclosed in parentheses and located
directly in the text . The complete reference will be included in a
"References" section at the end of the article. For example, "Another
problem arises if inductive methods are used to teach a generalization . The
generalization may be reified, treated as a fact, when all generalizations,
empirical or theoretical, are, as Popper argues, only corroborated for the
time being (Popper, 1959) ."
2) Do not cite references by means of footnotes .
3) Only substantive footnotes should be sequentially numbered within the
text and located at the end of the manuscript .
4) References should be alphabetized and located at the end of the
manuscript. They should take one of the following forms :
Hanna, Paul R ., and Lee, John R ., "Generalizations from the Social
Sciences," in Louis J . Hebert and William Murphy (eds .), Structure in
the Social Studies (Washington: National Council for the Social
Studies, 1968).
Kalsounis, Theodore, "Swing Toward Decision-Making," Instructor,
80 (April, 1971), 45-56 .
Kaplan, Abraham, The Conduct of Inquiry (San Francisco : Chandler
Publishing Company, 1964) .
Reston, James, "Primary and Secondary Questions," New York Times,
February 14, 1971, E-11 .
5) Do not list page numbers when complete books are cited .
6) Each table should be placed on a separate page and placed in a
separate section at the end of the mansucript . Arabic numbers should be
used for numbering tables ; they should be numbered consecutively
throughout the manuscript . Show where they belong in the text by the
following note :
Table One About Here
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7) Figures should be submitted in their final form . Use India ink and
place them on separate pages in a separate section at the end of the
manuscript. Number them and locate them in the text in the same way as
tables .
8) Send Manuscripts to :
Cleo H. Cherryholmes, Editor
Theory and Research in Social Education
Department of Political Science
Michigan State University
East Lansing, MI 48824
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